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WHAT MOTIVATES AN OLIGARCHIC ELITE TO DEMOCRATIZE? EVIDENCE FROM THE ROLL 
CALL VOTE ON THE GREAT REFORM ACT OF 1832 
Abstract.  
The Great Reform Act of 1832 was a watershed for democracy in Great Britain. We study the 
vote on 22 March 1831 in the House of Commons to test competing theories of 
democratization. Peaceful agitation and mass-support for reform played an important role. 
Political expedience also motivated some MPs to support reform, especially if they were 
elected in constituencies located in counties that would gain seats. Violent unrest in urban but 
not in rural areas had some influence on the MPs. Counterfactual scenarios suggest the bill 




The Great Reform Act of 1832 was a watershed in the development of democratic 
institutions in Great Britain and set in motion important economic and social reforms, 
including the reform of the Poor Laws, a new system of local government, the repeal of the 
Corn Laws and the factory acts regulation of working hours.1 In this article, we study what 
motivated the oligarchic elite to endorse democratic reform. We take advantage of the fact 
that the reform bill was debated and voted on in the British House of Commons by the 
Members of Parliament (henceforth MPs) elected under the rules of the Unreformed 
Parliament, as the British political system between the 1688 Glorious Revolution and 1832 is 
usually called. Specifically, we argue that the critical roll call vote that took place on 22 
March 1831, when the draft bill had a second reading and was passed with a one-vote 
majority, is critical for understanding democratization in an oligarchy.2 Arguably, a few 
additional votes against the bill could have stopped, or at least delayed, parliamentary reform 
and thus the economic reforms that followed, and it is therefore important, for historical 
reasons, to understand why this did not happen. 
From a theoretical perspective, the vote record of the MPs enables us to evaluate the 
relative importance of three prominent theories which shape the debate related to the 
extension of the voting franchise during the 19th and early 20th century in Western Europe 
                                                            
1 The link between the 1832 Reform Act and economic reform is particularly clear in the case of the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846 where many Tory MPs, who opposed the repeal, were concerned that the reform bill had 
empowered the free trade sectoral interest of urban manufacturers (Aydelotte 1967; Kindleberger 1975; 
Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, p. 40). Other examples of economic policies adopted in the wake of the Great Reform 
Act that favored the existing oligarchy include the reforms of factories in 1833, of poor laws in 1834 and of 
municipal corporations in 1835 (for example, Blaug, 1963; Nardinelli, 1980, 1990; Boyer, 1993). Mokyr (2009) 
provides a general overview of the period. 
2 The actual vote took place on 23 March 1831, at 3 am in the morning (Brock 1973, p. 176). We follow the 
convention to date the vote to 22 March 1831, when the last day of debate started. 
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(for example, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Collier 1999, Ziblatt 2006). The first is that 
democratization was the result of a “threat of revolution”. According to this view, the 
oligarchic elite that had a monopoly on political power saw little advantage in sharing this 
power with others. They only unwillingly conceded franchise extensions because they feared 
a revolution that would fundamentally overthrow the existing economic and political order; in 
other words, democratic reform was used to pre-empt a revolution. This theory has a long 
pedigree. It was George Macaulay Trevelyan (1920)'s interpretation of the Great Reform Act 
of 1832 and the theoretical work by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2000, 2008) 
and Carles Boix (2003) has given it new prominence.3 
The second theory sees democratization as demand-driven and politicians as 
influenced by peaceful agitation, lobbying and mass-mobilization in support of reform. Ben 
Ansell and David Samuels (2010, 2014), for example, stress that the new economic interests 
created by the industrial revolution in the 19th century demanded protection from the state in 
the form of a broader suffrage. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik (2006) and Erica 
Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2009, 2011) argue that non-violent mobilization was 
instrumental in bringing about democratization in several countries in South Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. The theoretical literature on informational 
lobbying (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2001) shows how agitation and costly mass-
mobilization can convey credible information about the intensity with which special-interest 
groups care about an issue. This can, in turn, convince politicians who are unsure about the 
right course of action to change their position. In short, expressions of public opinion can 
sway politicians leading to democratization. 
                                                            
3See also Falkinger (1999), Conley and Temimi (2001) and Dorsch and Maarek (2015). 
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The third theory is that democratization was the result of political expedience or self-
interest unrelated to any fear of revolution or agitation. Roger D. Congleton (2007, 2011) 
emphasizes Pareto-improving constitutional bargaining between King and Parliament; 
Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico (2004) emphasize that suffrage reform was used 
strategically by the elite to change the policy mix from particularistic spending to spending 
on public goods; Toke S. Aidt, Martin Daunton, and Jayasri Dutta (2010) view suffrage 
reform as a Pareto-improving exchange of tax revenue for political influence; Humberto 
Llavador and Robert J. Oxoby (2005) stress that co-opting some parts of the working class 
was beneficial to the oligarchic elite; and Gertrude Himmelfarb (1966) emphasizes party 
political advantage. The key idea underlying all these theories, however, is that it is in the 
self-interest of some part of the existing oligarchic elite to change the franchise rules. 
The Great Reform Act is well-suited to evaluate the relative extent to which (1) 
threats of revolution, (2) expressions of public opinion, or (3) political expedience induced 
the members of the ruling oligarchy to democratize. First, the fundamental difficulty with any 
test of the threat of revolution theory is that the threat is, by its very nature, not directly 
observed. We get around this difficulty by directly quantifying the degree of actual violent 
unrest preceding the second reading of the reform bill and use that as a proxy for the 
perceived threat of revolution (see, Przeworski (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2014), Aidt and 
Franck (2015) for a similar approach).4 Between Prime Minister Charles Grey’s 
announcement of parliamentary reform in November 1830 and the Royal assent on 7 June 
1832, England experienced high levels of social unrest which included a major violent rural 
                                                            
4 Another way around the difficulty is to use the stock or bond market as a barometer for how threatening 
investors perceive the situation to be and to use event study techniques to study market participants’ reactions to 
the passage of particular reforms or to events in the run-up to a reform. (for example, Turner and Zhan 2012; 
Lehmann et al. 2014; Dasgupta and Ziblatt, 2015; Seghezza and Morelli, In Press). 
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uprising in the hinterland of London (known as the Swing riots) and violent confrontations 
between workers and police in many of the fast expanding industrial cities in the North of 
England and in London (Tilly, 1995). Geographical dispersion in the intensity of violent 
unrest enables us to directly evaluate the effect of fears of revolution by comparing the votes 
of MPs elected in areas with high levels of violent unrest to those elected in areas with low 
levels. Second, during the same period, England not only experienced a rise in violent unrest, 
it also experienced a surge in public demand for democratic reform from civic society and 
special interest groups such as the Birmingham Political Union (Horn and Tilly 1988, Brock 
1973). This allows us to quantify the effect of peaceful mass mobilization through public 
meetings and demonstrations related to parliamentary reform in the areas where the MPs 
were elected on their vote on the bill. We also explore the fact that thousands of petitions 
related to the reform were presented to the House of Commons to measure lobbying for and 
against the reform and in that way quantify the role of lobbying on the vote of the MPs 
elected in the constituencies which petitioned. Third, we can directly evaluate the extent of 
self-interested voting because the bill’s two main features – redistribution of seats and reform 
of the suffrage rules – allow us, when combined with detailed bibliographic information, to 
predict whether a MP would personally benefit or lose from the bill. In particular, the 
appendices to the draft bill listed the constituencies to be disenfranchised (in other words, to 
lose the right to elect MPs) and the places, mainly the expanding industry cities in the 
Midlands and in the North of England, that were to gain representation. Moreover, the bill 
changed the voting franchise in the counties in favor of the landowners. These features allow 
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us to measure the geography of expected gains and losses, and in that way, test for political 
expedience in the voting behavior of the MPs.5  
The results of our econometric analysis show that conditional on party affiliation, the 
MPs’ votes were influenced by violent social unrest in urban (but not rural) areas, by peaceful 
agitation and expressions of mass-support for reform and were also motivated by political 
expedience. A “horse race” between the competing theories suggests that petitions and public 
agitation related to the reform were more important than fears of revolution created by 
exposure to violent urban unrest. Since the bill passed with a one-vote majority, two 
additional nays were all that was needed to block the bill. Our estimates enable us to evaluate 
counterfactual experiments to see if violent urban unrest, reform agitation and political 
expedience were substantive enough to switch at least two votes. We find that this was the 
case.   
Our paper is related to a growing literature that demonstrates the value of moving 
away from comparative analysis of the causes of democratization at the macroeconomic level 
(such as Gundlach and Paldam 2009; Dincecco et al. 2011; Aidt and Jensen 2017) towards 
detailed quantitative analysis of particular episodes of democratization at the microeconomic 
level (such as Copaccia and Ziblatt 2010; Berlinski and Dewan 2011). Within this new 
literature, our analysis is most directly related to Toke S. Aidt and Raphaël Franck (2013, 
2015) and Aditya Dasgupta and Daniel Ziblatt (2015) who test the threat of revolution theory 
in relation to the Great Reform Act of 1832. Aidt and Franck (2013) explore that a sequence 
of reform-related roll call votes, including the critical second reading on 22 March, took place 
in the House of Commons in 1831. Since the intensity of violent unrest also varied across this 
                                                            
5 Ziblatt (2008) pioneered this approach in his study of the (failed) reform of the voting system in Prussia in 
1912. It has also been adopted to study how sectorial interests affect support and opposition to trade policy 
(Schonhardt-Bailey 2006) and ballot reform (Mares 2015). 
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period, it is possible to evaluate the effect of fears of revolution on the voting behaviour of 
the MPs. They find suggestive evidence that the threat of revolution affected the pro-reform 
Whigs but had no effect on the opposition coming from the Tory party. Aidt and Franck 
(2015) study the general election in April-June 1831, exploiting the political geography of the 
Unreformed Parliament to link the election result to the degree of social violence observed in 
the immediate vicinity of each constituency during the Captain Swing riots in the winter of 
1830-31. They find, consistent with the threat of revolution theory, that exposure to local 
riots had a large causal effect on the likelihood that a pro-reform Whig MP was elected. 
Dasgupta and Ziblatt (2015) study the reaction of the British sovereign bond market to the 
social unrest that preceded the 1832 reform and show that the yield increased in the run-up to 
the reform but fell back immediately after it was passed. They interpret this as evidence in 
favour of the threat of revolution theory. Our study goes beyond this previous research by 
systematically evaluating three theories of democratization (including the threat of revolution 
theory) in relation to the critical second reading of the reform bill. Substantively, we add to 
the literature by showing that reform agitation and political expedience were important 
drivers of reform, and that the threat of revolution played a lesser role in securing a majority 
in favor of reform in March 1831.  
VOTING ON THE GREAT REFORM ACT: BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 Parliamentary reform in Britain 
Despite the relocation of economic activity and internal migration, the new economic 
centers in the North and in the Midlands had no representation in 1830, many constituencies 
established in the Middles Ages were largely depopulated, and a very small proportion of the 
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population had the right to vote (Brock 1973, Ch. 1).6  Indeed, the rules for elections to the 
House of Commons had not fundamentally changed in nearly 200 years.  
The 489 English Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected to the Unreformed 
House of Commons from 244 constituencies (Fischer 2009). The 41 English counties 
returned two to four MPs on a property-value qualified franchise while the borough 
constituencies (which were predominantly located in rural market towns) could, typically, 
return two MPs as did the graduates of the universities in Cambridge and Oxford. In the so-
called “rotten” boroughs, patrons, who were typically large local landowners, nominated the 
MPs.7  
The MPs received no salary and election was subject to a high property qualification. 
This prevented individuals from the lower classes from running and the House of Commons 
was dominated by men of substantial wealth, mostly landowners or their sons, merchants and 
industrialists. In addition to their main place of residence, which for the landed gentry would 
be a country estate and for merchants and industrialists would be in one of the larger 
provincial towns in the area where they were elected, most MPs had a residence in London. 
There was no requirement that a MP lived in the constituency in which he was elected and 
most did not, especially not if elected in a small rural (borough) constituency.  
                                                            
6Cannon (1973, appendix 4) estimates that approximately 344,250 adult males could vote in England out of a 
total population of 12,976,329.  
7 For instance, Dunwich was a prosperous port and market town when it was granted the privilege of returning 
two MPs in 1298. However, because of coastal erosion, all but one of the eight medieval parishes of Dunwich 
were under water by the end of the 18th century. Fisher (2009) estimates that in 1831, there were only 232 
inhabitants left and about 33 freemen of the borough could vote. However, in the larger constituencies, elections 
were more competitive and the electors could exhibit some political independence (O’Gorman 1989) although 
electoral corruption was rife in many places. 
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The MPs formed political groups in the House of Commons. The Whig and Tory 
parties made up the dominant factions, with a few Radical MPs elected in London and the 
larger provincial constituencies (in 1830). However, these factions were not political parties 
in the modern sense. They were factions with parliamentary leaders, core followers and 
regular supporters. They were sufficiently organized to hold meetings as well as to organize 
their own patronage networks and party finance but crucially, party discipline remained 
imperfect, even on seemingly core issues such as Catholic emancipation or parliamentary 
reform (Machin, 1964; Mitchell, 1967, Ch. 1; Hill 1996; Jupp 1998). This meant that the MPs 
had a large degree of freedom to determine how they would vote on particular bills.8 
Some attempts at parliamentary reform had been made from the 1780s onwards, 
notably in the 1820s by John Russell, Charles Grey and other leading Whig politicians, to 
address the uneven geographical distribution of seats, electoral corruption, and the limited 
voting franchise, but without success (Cannon 1973, Ch. 7) until the Great Reform Act of 
1832. The bill had two main pillars. First, it changed the suffrage rules by standardizing the 
franchise. All male householders in the borough constituencies who occupied property worth 
                                                            
8 Mitchell (1967, Chap. 1) provides several quotes by contemporaries and politicians who sat in the Unreformed 
Parliament as to how they defined party. Charles Grey's definition of party is particularly illuminating as an 
example of how the parliamentary factions differed from modern parties. He viewed party as "the connection of 
honourable and independent men to support their common principles, which they can do more effectually by 
united than by divided efforts. Thus supposes a general agreement on great public questions, and occasional 
concessions on points of minor importance where such become necessary for the general advantage; but none on 
leading and material principals; the moment there arises a disagreement on these the party is dissolved, on the 
same honourable ground on which it was first united. It was upon this principle, when very young that I 
originally connected myself with the whig party, and I was glad to have the advantage of being assisted and 
directed in my course, whilst I sacrificed nothing of my independent, by those for whose experience, and 
integrity and talents I had the highest respect" (Grey to S. Whitbread, n.d. [May 1820], cited by Mitchell (1967, 
p. 7). 
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£10 a year were given the vote while voting rights in the county constituencies were extended 
to copyholders of land and to various groups of tenant farmers (see Evans (2000, Appendix I) 
for details). Second, the bill redistributed seats from the small “rotten” boroughs to the large 
and growing industrial cities and to the counties. The immediate consequences of the reform 
were limited to redistribution of parliamentary seats, to a modest extension of the franchise to 
“respectable” segments of the middle class, and to the introduction of a uniform set of 
suffrage rules based on property. However, in the broader historical perspective, it must be 
viewed as a watershed that set in motion a long process of political and economic reforms 
(Maehl 1967, p. 1). 
The reform process started with the 1830 general election. The Tories, who had been 
in power since 1807 and who had opposed any attempt at parliamentary reform, could not 
agree on a new prime minister. This gave the Whigs, led by Charles Grey, an opportunity to 
form a government and to put the reform question on the agenda. Grey made his intentions 
clear in the House of Lords in November 1830, a few days after having been appointed prime 
minister:  
“The principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution….. The 
principle on which I mean to act is neither more nor less than that of reforming 
to preserve, and not to overthrow” (Hansard HL Deb 22 November 1830, vol. 
1, c613). 
The bill’s journey through the political process was, however, far from smooth and it could 
have failed at a number of hurdles along the way. Formally, as a piece of legislation 
sponsored by the government (a public bill), the legislative process started with a member of 
the government presenting the bill in the House of Commons where it was first read which 
was usually a matter of routine and rarely required a formal vote (Escott 2009). The bill was 
then printed to enable the MPs to consider its general principle. The critical junction was the 
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vote after the second reading in the House. If the bill obtained a majority of votes after the 
second reading debate, it went into a committee, for scrutiny clause by clause. For important 
public bills, such as the reform bill, this took place in a committee of the whole House. The 
bill with majority-supported amendments would then be returned to the House of Commons 
for general debate and a third reading, where further amendments could be made, before it 
was sent to the House of Lords. The Lords might vote for the bill without any modification 
and ask for royal assent, reject it, or modify it and send it back to the House of Commons. 
In Figure 1, we present a timeline of the main events related to the reform bill based 
on Michael Brock (1973). The first major hurdle was the second reading of the bill in the 
House of Commons on 22 March 1831 where it was approved in a 3am vote by the slightest 
of majorities: 302 in favor and 301 against. Prime Minister Grey was keenly aware that a 
one-vote majority was not sufficient to get the bill through the committee stage and the 
House of Lords without major concessions and he asked the King to dissolve parliament. The 
general election in April-June 1831 was the second hurdle and effectively became a 
referendum on parliamentary reform. Many anti-reform Tories were not returned and the 
election result gave the pro-reform Whigs the majority they needed to pursue the reform. In 
particular, in the 513 English and Welsh seats, the number of Whigs and Radicals increased 
from 220 to 289. In the three subsequent votes in the House of Commons in July, September, 
and December, the bill was supported by large majorities (Aidt and Franck 2013, Table 3). 
The third hurdle occurred in September 1831 when the House of Lords rejected the bill and 
send it back to the House of Commons. After the second reading of a revised bill on 17 
December 1831, where some concessions to the Lords were made, a frantic period of 
lobbying of individual Lords followed until the House of Lords approved the bill by a 9-vote-
majority in April 1832. Again, this was insufficient to get the bill through the committees, 
and Grey offered his resignation if the King did not promise to create enough new Lords, if 
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needed, to carry the bill. The King eventually made that promise and the bill passed as the 
Tory opposition did not wish to risk losing their majority in the House of Lords. The bill 
received royal assent on 7 June 1832. These hurdles were not only significant but the way 
each of them was overcome can also provide important insights into the mechanisms of 
democratization. In this study, we focus on the first hurdle, in other words, the second 
reading of the bill in the House of Commons, while Aidt and Franck (2015) study the second 
hurdle, in other words, the election in 1831. 
Out of the 658 MPs elected from across the United Kingdom to the House of 
Commons, only 27 (including 18 from England) were not present for the second reading on 
22 March 1831, with a further seven seats unfilled on the day. This was an abnormally large 
turnout. The net result, after 20 MPs including the four Tellers were paired off and the 
Speaker of the House followed tradition and abstained, was a one-vote majority (302 vs. 
301). Table 1 shows for the English seats the breakdown of the vote for the Tories, Whigs 
and the four Radical MPs, along with the vote totals for Wales, Scotland and Ireland. The 
majority of the 489 English MPs and of the 45 Scottish MPs voted against the bill while the 
majority of the 100 Irish and of the 24 Welsh MPs supported it. The opposition in England 
came almost exclusively from the Tories while the Radical MPs and the vast majority of the 
Whigs voted in favor. However, party discipline was imperfect: the 45 MPs who deviated 
from the party line were critical for the bill’s success.   
Social tension in 1830-31 
In the years that preceded the royal assent of the Great Reform Act, social tension was 
high in Britain and took many forms. Some of the protest was organized, peaceful and 
directed at the question of parliamentary reform, but some of it was violent and not, in most 
cases, directly related to parliamentary reform. Those differences could not have eluded the 
MPs who read newspapers, communicated with associates in their constituencies and, in 
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some cases, had access to Home Office reports. Before laying out our hypotheses in the next 
sub-section, we provide a typology of protests during the period.  
Social unrest and mass protest in Great Britain reached very high levels in the early 
1830s (Stevenson 1992; Bohstedt 2010). Charles Tilly (1995, p. 97 and Table 2.2) estimates 
that at least 91 individuals were killed, more than 2000 arrested and several million 
individuals were involved in various types of public protest. Some unrest was violent and had 
to be put down by force. We make a distinction between violent unrest in rural and urban 
areas. The largest wave of rural violent unrest was the Swing riots that took place between 
August 1830 and March 1831 when landless agricultural laborers in London’s hinterland 
burned hayricks, smashed threshing machines and demanded higher wages (Hobsbawm and 
Rudé 1973). Urban violent unrest included instances of violent street confrontations, for 
example, in Derby in 1830 and in Bristol in 1831, as well as turbulent strikes, e.g., in 
Barnsley, Bethnal Green, Coventry, Manchester, and Spitalfields in 1829 (Tilly, 1995). Such 
major events were widely reported in the local and national newspapers, but even what 
appears in hindsight to be some instance of minor street violence would be known to the 
MPs. For instance, the Morning Chronicle and the Times of London reported in the 10 
November 1830 edition that after a meeting near radical activist Richard Carlisle's 
ramshackle building (the Blackfriars Rotunda) on 9 November 1830, about 1000-1500 
persons confronted a detachment of the police with cries of “Down with the police!”, “No 
Wellington" and "No Peel!”. Home Secretary Robert Peel described it in the House of 
Commons as “some unpleasant collisions between the police and the mob at Temple Bar, and 
other parts of the Strand” (Mirror of Parliament, 10 November 1830, cited by Tilly (1995, 
p.314)). Hallmarks of violent unrest during the period were that it, on the one hand, was not 
(in most cases) related to parliamentary reform but to a variety of special economic and social 
demands and that it, on the other, helped steer up fears of a revolution. 
15 
However, most of the protest was peaceful expressions of public opinion. Partly due 
to less blatant government repression of organizations in the late 1820s, urban political 
associations, such as the Birmingham Political Union or the National Association for the 
Protection of the Workers, had become sufficiently organized to mobilize peaceful mass 
protest (Thompson 1963, Ch. 14). In the lead-up to the roll call vote in March 1831, they 
organized public meetings in support of the reform which, on occasion, attracted thousands of 
participants. In other instances, freeholders, parishioners or religious congregations met 
publicly to express their views on the reform question (Tilly 1995, Table 7.3). These events 
were announced in the local newspapers and often reported in the London-based national 
newspapers after the fact. For instance, a large peaceful demonstration in favor of reform was 
held in London on 12 October 1831. The following day, the Morning Chronicle described it 
as “about 300,000 inhabitants of the metropolis – chiefly tradespeople and industrial artisans, 
with the Parochial Officers at their head – walked in procession from their respective parishes 
to St. James's Palace” (Tilly, 1995, p. 329). Unlike violent unrest, much of the peaceful 
protest that took place during the period was directly linked to agitation for or against 
parliamentary reform. 
Individuals, groups or organizations could also petition Parliament directly (Jupp 
1998). According to the record in the Journals of the House of Commons, more than 3000 
petitions related to parliamentary reform were received between November 1830 and June 
1832. These petitions were addressed to particular MPs and presented in Parliament. Some of 
them were signed by thousands of people, such as one received by the MP John Savile 
Lumley in March 1831 from “2500 most respectable persons” (Hansard HC Deb 22 March 
1831, vol. 3, c705) among the freeholders of the county of Nottingham petitioning in favor of 
the reform. Others represented the view of smaller and more select groups such as the petition 
from the University of Cambridge against the reform (Hansard HC Deb 22 March 1831, vol. 
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3, c706). The petition system allowed organized groups outside the ruling elite to lobby by 
making their views on the reform question known directly to the MPs.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses  
The second reading of the Great Reform Act of 1832 provides a unique opportunity 
for testing three competing theories of democratization within a common framework. The 
first theory maintains that the autocratic politicians accept democratic reform because they 
fear a revolution. The Whig school of Victorian historians (e.g., McCarthy 1852; Trevelyan, 
1920, 1937, pp. 635-36) emphasized this theory in relation to the Great Reform Act and the 
threat of revolution is central to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006)’s theory of franchise 
extension. How threatening the MPs perceived the situation to be was a function of the actual 
level of violent unrest that came to their attention during the period before the second 
reading. The MPs would learn about violent unrest in the areas where they were elected 
through their networks of contacts or through direct observation, and would learn about major 
events across the country through the national newspapers. To a first approximation, the MPs 
had access to the same nation-wide information on violence, so the variation is their 
perception of the threat would primarily come from variation in violent unrest in their “local” 
area. We can formulate this as the first testable hypothesis: 
The Threat of Revolution Hypothesis: MPs who were elected in areas exposed to violent 
unrest perceived a greater threat of revolution and were more likely to vote in favor of the 
reform.  
The literature on information lobbying and persuasion, e.g., David Austen-Smith 
(1994), Susanne Lohmann (1995), Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001), Morten 
Bennedsen and Sven E. Feldmann (2006), shows how interest groups, by sending costly 
signals through, for example, large demonstrations or petitions, can convey credible 
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information about the intensity with which they care about an issue.9 Insofar as the 
policymakers are uncertain about the merits of a particular reform, they may in that way be 
influenced by agitation and lobbying and change their mind. This second theory of political 
reform argues that MPs who were unsure about the value of reform would take a clue from 
public expressions of reform support or targeted petitions related to the reform question. The 
key difference between the violent unrest that fuels fears of a revolution and peaceful reform 
agitation (besides the fact that one is violent and the other is peaceful) is that threat 
perceptions are governed by observations of violent unrest, whether directly related to the 
reform question or not, while reform agitation must be related directly to the reform question 
and thus must be specific. We can thus formulate the second testable hypothesis as  
The Public Opinion Hypothesis: MPs who were elected in areas with large-scale public 
demonstrations of reform support or who were lobbied by reform-supporting constituency 
interest groups were more likely to vote in favor of the reform. 
The third theory maintains that politicians implement major political reforms because 
they expect to benefit, politically and/or personally, from the new constitutional framework 
and the new policies that it enables. For the elite or subsets thereof, the prospective gain from 
reform might be expected changes in post-reform policy (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico 2004; 
Llavador and Oxoby 2005; Aidt et al. 2010) or in electoral support (e.g., Himmelfarb 1966). 
However, for individual politicians, the most immediate consideration relates to their chances 
of keeping their seat under the new rules. We formulate this as the third testable hypothesis:  
                                                            
9 Even “cheap talk” can be influential as long as the sender and receiver have sufficiently overlapping interests 
(Crawford and Sobel 1982). 
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The Political Expedience Hypothesis: The MPs followed their own narrow self-interest and 
voted against (for) the bill if they expected that the proposed allocation of seats or the new 
voting rules would make is harder (easier) for them to gain election. 
DATA 
We draw our data from a variety of primary and secondary sources. The unit of 
analysis of the main cross-sectional dataset is a parliamentary seat in the House of Commons 
during the session which lasted from 26 October 1830 to 22 April 1831. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main analysis. The full dataset is deposited 
as Aidt and Franck (2019). 
We note that 658 MPs were elected in constituencies in Scotland, Ireland, Wales and 
England. However, we do not include the Scottish or Irish MPs in the analysis because we do 
not have data on social unrest and mass mobilization in Scotland and Ireland. In fact, the 
Great Reform Act did not affect Scotland or Ireland. In the subsequent Scottish Reform Act 
and Irish Reform Act, however, Scotland obtained eight additional seats and Ireland obtained 
five. No constituency was disenfranchised in either Scotland or Ireland. As in England and 
Wales, voter qualifications were standardized and the electorate was expanded (see Evans 
2000, Appendix I).  
Reform support in the House of Commons  
 Our main analysis relates to the 489 English MPs elected in 244 constituencies,10 466 
of whom were present and voted on 22 March 1831 (9 Tories and 9 Whigs were absent, four 
English seats were vacant and the speaker, traditionally, abstained). For each of these 466 
English MPs, we create the variable yes vote which is equal to one if the MP supported the 
bill and equal to zero if he voted no (excluding the Speaker). For the sample of the 489 
                                                            
10 Most constituencies returned two MPs, but six had just one and two county constituencies had four seats. 
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English seats, we also create the variable present which is equal to one if the MP elected to a 
seat was present in the House of Commons for the vote and zero if not (excluding the four 
vacant English seats and the Speaker).11 In the statistical analysis presented below, we discuss 
reasons which might explain the absence of the 18 MPs from the second reading of the bill 
and we also extend the sample with the 24 Welsh MPs, who all attended the vote.  
Public Opinion and the Threat of Revolution 
To test the Public Opinion Hypothesis, we need to quantify the MPs’ exposure to 
public opinion, agitation and mass mobilization. We draw on two sources to do this. First, we 
construct a new constituency-level measure of lobbying from primary sources. As we noted 
above, it was common for constituency-based lobby groups to send petitions to Parliament 
either in support of or in opposition to specific bills or issues. These petitions are recorded in 
the Journals of the House of Commons (1828-1831, vol. 83-86). Based on word searches on 
the names of the 244 English constituencies, we count the number of petitions related to the 
reform campaign which originated from each constituency between 1 January 1828 and 22 
March 1831.12 We code the variable petitions as the difference between the number of 
petitions for and against parliamentary reform. This measures constituency-level lobbying in 
favor of reform and enables us to test if the MPs were influenced by the views of the people 
living in the constituencies in which they were elected. Second, to quantify the broader 
patterns of agitation and mass mobilization, we draw on the studies of Horn and Tilly (1988) 
                                                            
11 Hansard (1831, vol. 2, pp. 719-826) contains the division list with the complete record of the yes and no votes 
cast along with the names and constituencies of all MPs. It also lists those who were absent, those who were 
paired off and those who were Tellers.  
12During the parliamentary session of 1828, 1829, and 1830 (up to the election held in July to September) only 
20 petitions related to parliamentary reform were received, while 400 were received between 14 September 
1830, and 22 March 1831. This does not include petitions from unrepresented areas. 
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and Tilly (1995) who collected information on various forms of “popular protest” in England 
between 1828 and 1834 from textual analysis of eight London-based periodicals (Annual 
Register, Gentleman’s Magazine, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, London Chronicle, 
Mirror of Parliament, Morning Chronicle, The Times and Votes and Proceedings of 
Parliament). Tilly (1995, p. 63) defines “popular protest” as an event where “10 or more 
people gather in a publicly accessible place and make claims on other people, including 
holders of power, claims which if realized would affect the interests of their object”. Each 
event is characterized by several elements describing date and location (usually, the county), 
an estimate of the number of people involved, who was making the claim, and against whom 
the claim was directed. We use three types of peaceful protest that happened between 1 
January 1828 and 22 March 1831 as proxies for agitation and mass mobilization. Meetings 
involved organized events where a group of individuals congregated with prior notice, while 
gatherings were more spontaneous and included street protests of various sorts, including 
demonstrations, which remained peaceful and non-violent.13 While meetings and gatherings 
enable us to study different types of peaceful protest, some of these meetings and gatherings 
were not related to the reform question. Our third and main proxy reform agitation uses the 
classification of Horn and Tilly (1988) to single out the subset of peaceful meetings and 
gatherings which were related to the reform question.14 This provides us with a direct 
measure of reform agitation. 
                                                            
13 Tilly and Horn (1988) also record the number of delegations. Since there were very few of those (less than 1 
percent of all events), we combine them with the meetings. 
14 The quality of the data on public protest is remarkable. They were hand-collected over a 12-year period in the 
1970s and 1980s by a research team led by Charles Tilly and coded independently by several researchers (Horn 
and Tilly, 1988). The very labor-intensive collection method minimizes, if not eliminates altogether, false 
positives. By definition, the dataset does not include minor events with less than 10 people involved and it does 
not include events that happened but were not reported in the national newspapers which were the primary 
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 To test the Threat of Revolution hypothesis, we also draw on Horn and Tilly (1988). 
We single out the events between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831 that involved violent 
unrest which we contend can be used as a proxy for the MPs’ perceptions of the threat of 
revolution. We further sub-divide violent unrest into unrest that took place in rural (violent 
rural) and urban (violent urban) areas.15 Violent unrest in urban areas might have been 
perceived as being more threatening than unrest in the countryside (Do and Campante 2009).  
Over the period from 1 January 1828 to 22 March 1831, Nancy Horn and Charles 
Tilly (1988) record 2726 protest events.16 For many of the events, they give an estimate of the 
number of individuals involved and for each type of protest, we calculate the number of 
individuals involved in the events in each county. It is important to take this into account, as a 
small protest (e.g., a meeting) with 10 individuals involved would have been perceived very 
                                                            
sources. This will tend to underestimate protest. Tilly (1995, p. 398) compares his data from the national 
newspapers with information extracted from the Lancaster Gazette (a regional newspaper) and concludes that 
“local and specialized periodicals sometimes reported more events within their own purviews than our national 
periodicals, but not always and rarely with significantly more detail”. For our purpose, it is appropriate to focus 
on the main events that made it to the national newspapers as these are the ones that were most likely to catch 
the attention of the MPs.  
15Horn and Tilly (1988) do not make a rural-urban distinction. We proxy violent rural protest by the violent 
events related to the Swing riots and violent urban protest by the residual number of violent events in the 
county. While all the Swing riots were rural in nature, there might be some element of rural protest in the proxy 
for violent urban protest, but most would have been urban.  
16Horn and Tilly (1988) code the information on the number of people involved as a lowest, best and highest 
estimate to reflect that the sources not always give a precise number. We use the best estimate under the 
assumption that this is also the number than the MPs at the time would have associated with the protest. For 
protests where no information is provided, we assume that 10 individuals were at least involved, as otherwise 
the event would not have been coded in the database. This means that the estimates of the number of people 
involved is a lower bound.  
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differently from a large public demonstration with thousands of participants, such as the 
reform support meeting in Manchester on 8 March 1831, which according to the Times was 
attended by 3,000 people.17 We consider that each MP was influenced by the scale of the 
events which occurred in the county where his constituency was located. This is reasonable 
because counties were natural information hubs for the constituencies and each county had a 
newspaper which reported local news and those from London (see below, for a discussion of 
newspaper circulation).18 For each type of protest, we thus attribute to each constituency the 
total number of participants in public protest events which occurred in its county. We define 
the variable all protest as the aggregate of all types of protest. While we use the number of 
participants in protests (in 10,000s) in the main analysis, we show in Table A1 in the online 
appendix that normalizing this number by the total population or by the number of adult 
males does not affect the results. We also report in Table A2 in the online appendix a 
replication of the results with the protest variables coded by summing up the number of 
events by county, irrespective of the number of people involved.  
In Table 3, we list the distribution of public protests recorded between 1 January 1828 
and 22 March 1831, classified by the type of protest and disaggregated within the six main 
regions of England and Wales. Most of the protest was peaceful, but 20 percent of the events 
did involve violence. The average number of participants was 441. Violent events in rural 
areas involved fewer individuals than violent events in urban areas. While there were many 
more meetings than gatherings, gatherings had much larger average participation (2068 
compared to 286). Reform supporting meetings and gatherings constituted 18.3 percent of all 
peaceful protest with participation of 30.2 percent of all individuals involved in these 
activities. In Figure 2a, we map the geographical distribution of participants in all types of 
                                                            
17The Times (London, England), Tuesday, 8 March 1831; pg. 4; Issue 14481  
18 See House of Commons (1833a) for a record of local newspapers in 1833.  
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protest across England by county, and further distinguish between peaceful protest and 
violent unrest in Figures 2b and 2c.19 Peaceful protests took place in the industrial towns in 
the North and Midlands and in and around London. Violent protest was concentrated in the 
hinterland of London (mostly rural unrest) and in the North of England (mostly urban unrest).  
Figure 3 plots the monthly series of participation in peaceful protest (measured on the 
right-hand y-axis) and violent unrest (measured on the left-hand y-axis) in England between 1 
January 1830 and 1 April 1831. We note that the number of peaceful protests grew in the 
period leading up to the vote on the Reform Bill. The peak in May 1830 was a large meeting 
with more than 100,000 participants in Warwickshire and the high level of protest during the 
summer corresponds to the polling period of the 1830 general election. Violent protests were 
more concentrated in time. The spike in violence, which occurred in November and 
December 1830, corresponds to the peak of the violent riots instigated by landless 
agricultural laborers (the Swing riots). 
Political expedience  
To test the Political Expedience Hypothesis, the details of the draft bill enable us to 
identify prospective winners and losers. Obviously, the MPs elected in the constituencies 
which were scheduled to be disenfranchised had a personal reason to vote against the bill. We 
code the indicator variable disenfranchised as equal to one if the constituency that a MP 
represented was scheduled in the draft bill to lose all seats and zero otherwise.  
Patronage played an important role in the Unreformed Parliament. The MPs elected in 
the borough constituencies controlled by patrons might have been under pressure to oppose 
reform because the new rules would undermine the old system of patronage even if the 
                                                            
19 Figure A1 in the online appendix reports the geographic distribution of participants in gatherings and 
meetings.  
24 
constituency continued to exist. Based on the contextual information about each constituency 
provided by J. Holladay Philbin (1965) and the complete record of contested and uncontested 
elections provided by John A. Cannon (1973), we construct the variable Patron controlled 
which is coded as one if the constituency was under full or partial control of a local patron or 
by the Treasury or if no contested election had taken place since 1802, and zero otherwise. 
Out of the 244 English constituencies, 188 were controlled by patrons.20 While the patrons 
controlled who represented the constituencies, they did not necessarily control how the 
selected MPs voted on each piece of legislation, but could certainly exert pressure on specific 
votes, for example, by threatening not to select the MP at the next election, and had a strong 
incentive to do so with regard to the reform bill.21  
The reform bill was a threat to the political influence of the landed elite by 
redistributing seats from the small “rotten” borough constituencies in the countryside to the 
expanding industrial cities in the North of England and in the Midlands. At the same time, the 
                                                            
20 The number is consistent with that implied by a petition to the House of Commons from the Society of 
Friends of the People in 1793. It claimed that 157 members were sent to parliament by 84 individuals and that 
150 others were returned on the recommendation of 70 powerful individuals (Hammond and Hammond 1911, p 
19). This suggests that at least 152 constituencies were controlled by patrons or, as in the case of the corporation 
franchise, their agents. 
21 For example, the Whig MP William Henry Lytton Earle Bulwer, who represented Wilton in Wiltshire, owed 
his seat, which was to be disenfranchised, to a Tory patron who most likely put pressure on him not to vote for 
reform on 22 March 1831 (Fisher 2009). Another example which shows how a MP defied the wish of his patron 
comes from Cornwall, where James Willoughby Gordon wrote to his patron, who wanted him to oppose the bill, 
that it was “quite impossible for me as the senior officer upon the King’s staff to vote against His Majesty’s 
government under any circumstances whatever.” (Fisher 2009). This, nevertheless, appears to be more an 
exception than the rule. In the words of Charles James Fox speaking in the House of Commons about the issue 
in 1797 “when a Gentleman … represents a noble lord or a noble duke, … he is not considered a man of honour 
who does not implicitly obey the orders of a single constituent.” (Hammond and Hammond, 1911, p. 19). 
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draft bill sought to extend the existing voting franchise in the counties to include £10 
copyholders and various types of leaseholders and increased the number of county seats from 
80 to 144. These new voters owed their livelihood to the local landlords and their vote could 
be influenced by the landed elite. As such, this franchise extension was seen as an attempt to 
compensate the landed interest for the loss of their influence in the disenfranchised rural 
boroughs (Brock 1973, p. 222). We code the indicator variable landed interest as one if a MP 
was elected to a county seat and zero if he was elected to either a borough or to one of the 
university seats.  
As a more general measure of the expected benefit of seat redistribution, we construct 
the variable net seat gain. It codes the difference between the number of seats allocated to 
each county and to the borough constituencies located within its borders by the reform and 
the number of seats in the Unreformed Parliament.22 MPs elected in a particular county 
would have a ready-made network of supporters in that area enabling them to take advantage 
of the new seats to be established post reform. This variable, therefore, measures the extent to 
which the MPs supported (opposed) the reform because of seat gains (losses) in “their” 
county. 
Political and economic control variables 
Political parties  
                                                            
22The source is the appendices to the bill reported in The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland (1832, pp. 154–206) and Philbin (1965). In the results reported in the text below, we use the final seat 
distribution to calculate the gain/loss in seats. In Table A2, column (10), in the online appendix, we show a 
specification where we use the proposed reallocation recorded in the appendices of the bill second read on 22 
March 1831. It makes almost no difference to the point estimates. 
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As noted above, “party affiliation” is a strong predictor of how a MP voted. The 
reform bill was sponsored by the Whig leadership and supported by most Whig MPs (only 
eight English Whig MPs voted against). It was strongly opposed by the Tory leadership and 
most backbench Tories, yet 37 English Tory MPs voted for the bill (see Table 1). This 
reflected the fundamental disagreement about the role of MPs as “trustees”, who saw it as 
their role to act as they thought to be in the national or wider public interest, or “delegates”, 
who should act in accordance to the demands of their constituents or broader special interests 
(see the discussion in the online appendix) as well as about the role of landownership as the 
core constitutional principle. We need to control for “party affiliation” so that our tests can 
isolate the influence of public opinion, political expedience and threat of revolution on the 45 
MPs who voted against the “party line” and whose votes were pivotal.  
It is not a straightforward task to determine the political affiliation of the MPs. The 
Tory and Whig groups were relatively loose organizations and some MPs changed their 
allegiance over their political careers. We evaluated and compared the bibliographical 
information provided by Charles R. Dod and Robert Phipps Dod (1832), Lewis B. Namier 
and John Brooke (1964), Henry Stooks Smith (1973), R.G. Thorne (1986), and David Fisher 
(2009) to construct a complete record of the political affiliations of all the English MPs 
elected in 1830. We code the indicator variable Whig/Radical as one if a MP was a Whig or a 
Radical and as zero if he was a Tory to capture the MPs’ association with political factions in 
the Unreformed Parliament.  
Newspaper circulation 
Newspaper circulation can be used to proxy for the general flow of information. In the 
1830s, London was the information hub of England. The MPs had access to the major 
London newspapers as well as local newspapers from the area from which they were elected, 
which would often repeat news stories from the London papers (Barker 2000). Many of the 
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newspapers were supportive of reform (Jupp 1998) and reported extensively on the 
proceeding in Parliament. The newspapers were also a major source of information on public 
protest and the national newspapers often reported on meetings and other reform-related 
events outside London.23 Newspapers were subject to stamp duties on each sheet of paper.24 
Since the accounts of the Stamp Office report the stamp duties paid by each newspaper, it is 
possible to estimate newspaper circulation within each county. We code the variable, local 
newspapers, as the number of newspapers sold per year in each county in 100,000s (see the 
online appendix for details).  
Economic fundamentals  
Based on the 1831 Census of Great Britain, we consider two aspects of the economic 
environment: employment concentration and population density. First, we measure 
employment concentration in each constituency with a Herfindahl index, emp. Herfindahl 
index. It is computed as the sum of the square of the share of individuals in each census 
registration district working in agriculture, in trade, as professionals and in other occupational 
categories.25  Emp. Herfindahl index varies between zero and one: a value closer to one 
                                                            
23 See, for example, The Times (London, England), Friday, 4 March 1831; pg. 4; Issue 14478; The Times 
(London, England), Tuesday, 8 March 1831; pg. 4; Issue 14481, or The Times (London, England), Friday, 11 
March 1831; pg. 4; Issue 14484. 
24Stamp duties made newspapers too expensive for ordinary people. In contrast, the MPs had access to all the 
major London newspapers and could mail copies free of charge to family and patrons in their constituency. The 
source of this information is two returns to Parliament in 1833 about the number of stamps issued for all London 
and all English provincial newspapers (House of Commons, 1833a, 1833b). While there may be inaccuracies 
with respect to the stamp returns of some newspapers, the figures should overall give a fair picture of the total 
circulation of newspapers in that year.  
25The occupation categories are those tabulated in the 1831 Census of Great Britain and each constituency is 
matched to the Census registration district that is the closest geographical unit.  
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implies that employment is concentrated in fewer sectors. Second, we measure population 
density as the number of individuals per inhabited house in the constituency, as recorded in 
1831 Census of Great Britain. We conjecture that areas with more concentrated employment 
structures and higher population density could articulate reform support (or opposition) more 
effectively.  
 
Personal characteristics of the MPs 
We account for the possibility that the personal and professional characteristics of the 
MPs might have influenced their votes. From the bibliographical notices compiled by Fisher 
(2009), we obtain information on the MPs’ age, education and occupation. We record 
whether a MP attended secondary school and/or university. About 74% of the MPs attended 
secondary school while 66% also attended university. At the time, a very small fraction of the 
population had access to higher education, and as such, the MPs were a highly selected group 
of educated men. We also build an indicator variable coding whether they carried out a Grand 
Tour. The Grand Tour was the educational rite of passage for the members of the British 
aristocracy in their early 20s to get them acquainted with classical and contemporary art and 
culture in Continental Europe, in particular in France and in Italy (Trease 1967; Hibbert 
1987). The Grand Tour might also be viewed as a proxy for some open-mindedness and 
interest in continental philosophy and political ideas (see in particular, Mitchell (2005, Chap. 
5) on the Whigs' bond with France). Almost 10% of the MPs had taken the Grand Tour. We 
also record the number of years that a MP had served in the House of Commons by 1831 
which can be interpreted as a measure of experience. The average length of tenure in the 
1830-31 parliament was 11 years. The occupations of the MPs also reflect the aristocratic 
nature of the pre-1832 Parliament: they were army officers, jurists or lawyers, bankers, 
industry owners, merchants or landowners. Some of them were “dynasty heirs”, in other 
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words, MPs who were immediately returned to Parliament when they finished their education 
and/or reached majority. Finally, many had family members who also held seats.  
 
Relationships amongst the control variables 
Tables 4 and 5 report descriptive statistics to highlight the relationship among the 
control variables. In Table 4, we report correlation coefficients between selected explanatory 
variables along with their significance levels. We notice that the control variables are not 
particularly highly correlated. The correlation coefficient between Whig/Radical and 
Patronage is -0.19 and that between Whig/Radical and Rotten is -0.18 (both coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level). In Table 5, we report mean comparisons tests of differences in 
the constituency characteristics for the sub-samples of constituencies with Whig/Radical and 
Tory MPs. We find that constituencies which returned Whigs did not, in general, experience 
significantly more protests than those which returned Tories, but the type of protest did vary. 
In particular, there were more violent urban unrest, more meetings and a greater number of 
pro-reform petitions in constituencies that elected Whigs and more violent rural unrest in 
constituencies that elected Tories. The two tables confirm that more Tories were returned in 
rotten boroughs and in constituencies controlled by patrons while more Whigs were elected 
in urban constituencies where elections were somewhat open. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To test the Threat of Revolution, the Public Opinion and the Political Expedience 
Hypotheses, we relate violent unrest, peaceful protest and petitions, and political expedience to 
each MP’s vote for or against reform and estimate the following probit model:  
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑘,𝑑,𝑐 = 1)  




where Ф is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution, yes vote is equal to 
one if MP k elected in constituency d in county c voted in favor of the bill, and zero if he 
opposed it. The vector threat represents combinations of the various measures of violent 
unrest (violent unrest, rural violent, urban violent); the vector opinion collects combinations 
of the variables that proxy for public opinion (peaceful protest, meetings, gatherings, reform 
agitation and petitions); the vector expedience collects the four measures of political 
expedience (net seat gain, disenfranchised, Patron controlled, and landed interest); and the 
vector X represents the control variables (which are, in the main specification, local 
newspapers, emp. Herfindahl index, and population density). We control for Whig/Radical in 
all specifications. 
The model is hierarchical: seats belong to constituencies which are located within 
counties. Since our main explanatory variables are measured at the county or the constituency 
level, they are perfectly correlated within those clusters. It is also likely that the errors are 
correlated for seats and constituencies within a given county. To avoid basing inference on 
standard errors which are likely to be downwards biased, we report standard errors that are 
clustered at the county level (Cameron and Miller 2015).  
Nine Whigs and nine Tories from England were not present in Parliament for the vote 
on 22 March 1831. The date for the second reading of the bill was known in advance and the 
second reading itself followed several days of debates. It is unlikely that any of the absent MPs 
were unaware of the intensity of the discussions in the House of Commons or that they would 
be uninformed about when the final vote would approximately take place. Since any one of the 
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absent MPs could have been pivotal in the vote had they been present, it is important to 
consider their participation decision. For most of them, we know why they were not present. 
Table 9, which provides detailed information on this question for each of the absent MPs, 
shows that by far the most common reason was poor health or planned absence to attend to 
private business. Yet, it is possible that the decisions of some of these MPs (not) to attend 
Parliament on that day and (not) to vote on the bill were taken jointly. For example, the absent 
MPs might have decided not to attend because they did not have any personal stake in the 
reform, or because they, as in the case of William Henry Little Earle Bulwer, did not want to 
confront their patron, or because they were discouraged from taking the trip to London by fear 
of social unrest. If this were the case, our estimates of equation (1) would suffer from a 
selection bias. We can correct for such a bias using a Heckman-Probit model (Van de Ven and 
van Pragg 1981). This entails estimating a selection equation which models the probability of 
being present for the vote and then adjusting the outcome equation (equation (1)) for the 
selection effect. We consider that two variables can be excluded from the outcome equation 
because they explain the MPs’ presence in the House of Commons for the vote, but are 
(plausibly) unrelated to the MPs’ vote decisions. First, the distance from a MP’s constituency to 
London directly affected how cumbersome it was to get to London, if he was not residing at the 
time in his London residence, but arguably did not have any direct impact on the vote decision. 
Second, the MP’s age would be a factor and it is reasonable to suppose that old age could 
explain why a MP was not present at 3 am in the morning when the vote was taken. We thus 
write the selection equation of the Heckman-Probit model as  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑘,𝑑,𝑐 = 1) =  Φ(𝛽0 + 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑐𝛽1 + 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑐𝛽2 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑐𝛽3 +
                                                                  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑   𝛽4 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘 𝛽5 + 𝑋𝑘,𝑑,𝑐𝛽6),                      (2) 
where Ф is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution, present is equal to 
one if MP k elected in constituency d in county c was present in the House of Commons on 
22 March 1831, and equal to zero if he was not. The variable distance is the inverse crow-fly 
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distance (in kilometers) from each constituency to London and age is a second degree 
polynomial in the age of the MP. The other variables are defined as above. 
RESULTS 
Public protest versus political expedience  
In Table 6, we start by presenting our estimates of the effect of all protest and of the 
four variables capturing political expedience (net seat gain, disenfranchised, Patron 
controlled, and landed interest) on the probability that the 466 English MPs present voted in 
favor of the Reform Bill on 22 March 1831. In this and subsequent tables, we report marginal 
effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Column 1 reports a parsimonious 
specification, while we progressively add controls in columns 2 and 3. Column 4 reports the 
results from a sample which is extended with the seats in Wales. Columns 5 and 6 report 
results from the Heckman-Probit model.  
The results show that public protest mattered. The point estimate on all protest is 
significant at the 5 percent level, the coefficient is stable, and it does not matter if Wales is 
included in the sample or not. Intuitively, if the home county of a MP had been exposed to an 
increase of one standard deviation in the number of protest participants (58,000), this would 
have increased the probability that he voted in favor of the reform bill by 8.7 percentage 
points (Table 6, column 3). The regression results also suggest that political expedience, as 
proxied by the net seat gain, disenfranchised, patron controlled and landed interest variables, 
mattered for the MPs’ vote decisions. In the preferred specification in column 3, MPs 
representing the landed interest were 27 percentage points more likely to support the bill than 
other MPs. MPs from constituencies in counties that stood to gain additional representation 
were also more likely to vote for reform: an increase in net seat gain of one increased a MP’s 
likelihood of supporting reform by 0.7 percentage points. In contrast, neither the MPs elected 
in the “rotten” boroughs which stood to lose representation (disenfranchised), nor those 
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elected in constituencies dominated by a local patron (patron controlled) were more likely 
than the other MPs to oppose the bill.  
Further inspection of Table 6 confirms that Whig and Radical MPs were much more 
likely to support reform than Tory MPs, as indicated by the positive and significant sign of 
Whig/Radical. This variable controls for the ideological predisposition of the MPs and so, the 
probit regressions estimate how public protest and political expedience caused the MPs to 
deviate from this pre-disposition or the wishes of the party leaderships. We also observe that 
MPs from constituencies with a higher employment Herfindahl index, and thus with a more 
concentrated employment structure, were more likely to oppose parliamentary reform. Local 
newspapers and population density are negatively correlated with the support for reform, but 
not significant. Column 3 includes the only personal characteristic that was significantly 
related to the MP’s vote decision: MPs with an army career were 16 percentage points less 
likely to support the bill than other MPs.26  
Table 6, columns 5 and 6, report the result of the Heckman-Probit model that accounts 
for self-selection regarding the presence of MPs in the House of Commons on 22 March 
1831.  The three variables used to identify the selection equation (column 6) have the 
expected signs, but the (inverse) distance to London is not significant. The polynomial in age 
is, however, significant and suggests a sharp decline in the attendance probability around the 
age of 41 years. The selection correction has little influence on the outcome equation (column 
5) and the results related to protest and political expedience are not modified except for the 
fact that net seat gain become insignificant.  
                                                            
26In Table A4 in the online appendix, we report Probit estimations that include all the various personal 
characteristics (age, experience in parliament, occupation and social circumstances) and after applying a 
general-to-specific algorithm only army career is significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Finally, in Table A1 in the online appendix, we reproduce the result of column 3 in 
Table 6 but with different coding of the main variables. The results are similar when, instead 
of the number of participants in protest, we use the number of protests, the number of 
protesters per capita and the number of protesters per adult male. Furthermore, net seat gain 
has a positive and significant effect when we recode it in percent.  
Violent unrest and peaceful protest  
The results reported in Table 6 support the Political Expedience Hypothesis and 
demonstrate that overall exposure to public protest – a combination of violent unrest and 
peaceful protest – increased support for the reform bill. In Table 7, we present results related 
to the Threat of Revolution Hypothesis and the Public Opinion Hypothesis by making a 
distinction between violent unrest and peaceful protest and by further disaggregating violent 
unrest into rural and urban violence and peaceful protest into meetings, gatherings and 
reform agitation. Since some of these variables are highly correlated (see Table A6 in the 
online appendix), we enter them one by one before presenting a “horse race” regression. 
In Table 7, columns 1 and 2, we disaggregate all protest into violent unrest and 
peaceful protest. We see that the positive effect of violent unrest is imprecisely estimated 
while peaceful protest influenced the MPs’ vote decisions, with an extra 10,000 peaceful 
protesters increasing the MPs’ support for reform by 1.6 percentage points. The further 
decomposition of violent unrest in Table 7, columns 3 and 4 into rural violent and urban 
violent, however, shows that urban violent had a significant and large positive effect of the 
probability of voting yes, while rural violent did not have an effect. We see that an extra 
10,000 participants in violent unrest in urban areas increased the MPs’ support for reform by 
24 percentage points. These results are consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis and 
suggest that what the elite feared most was an urban uprising. It is also consistent with the 
observation that many MPs did not reside in the countryside for most of the winter months, 
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even if they owed property there (as we noted above). Consequently, many of them had not 
been directly exposed to the Swing riots (in the winter of 1830-31) which were the largest 
violent rural revolt in our sample period.  
Table 7, columns 5 and 6 disaggregate peaceful protest into two different types: 
meetings and gatherings. Both types of protest had a positive effect on the MPs’ votes: they 
increased the support for reform by 2.1 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively, with an extra 
10,000 participants. In Table 7, column 7, we single out those meetings and gatherings which 
Horn and Tilly (1988) identified as being explicitly related to the reform question and we see 
a highly significant positive effect of this type of agitation. The point estimate on reform 
agitation suggests that an extra 10,000 participants in reform-related agitation and mass 
protest would have increased support for reform by 2.5 percentage points. Furthermore, Table 
7, column 8 shows that petitions in favor of reform originating from a constituency increased 
the probability of a yes vote from the MPs elected in that constituency by 0.027 percentage 
points per additional petition. In all these specifications, we consider one (unrest or protest) 
variable at the time. In Table 7, column 9, we report the results of a “horse race” specification 
which pitches the two variables rural violent and urban violent that capture the threat of 
revolution against the two variables reform agitation and petitions that capture peaceful 
reform-specific agitation and lobbying. We find that petitions and reform agitation are 
statistically significant while rural violent and urban violent are not. This suggests that 
peaceful agitation or lobbying aimed specifically at the reform question had a stronger 
influenced on the MPs than urban unrest and the fears of revolution that such unrest may 
have conjured up.27 
                                                            
27As a complement to the econometric analysis, we discuss in the online appendix the importance of the threat 
of revolution, public agitation, lobbying and mass-mobilization, and political expedience as perceived by the 
participants themselves and contemporaneous observers by drawing on the transcripts of the debates in the 
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Table A3 in the online appendix reports additional regression results where we 
exclude the MPs elected in the City of London, in Westminster and in the county of 
Middlesex. The motivation for this robustness check is that London was the capital and was 
consequently, along with its immediate vicinity, the center of political agitation. The results 
are less precisely estimated, but otherwise similar to those reported in Table 7. 
Two counterfactual scenarios  
We present two counterfactual scenarios that are designed to assess the magnitude of 
the estimated effects and to evaluate if the threat of revolution, public opinion and political 
expedience exerted a sufficiently powerful effect on the MPs to be considered pivotal in the 
outcome of the vote. In the first counterfactual scenario, we analyze what would have 
happened if the MPs who attended the second reading on 22 March 1831 had been exposed to 
other levels of violent unrest (urban violent) and reform related agitation (reform agitation 
and petitions) than the actual levels they were exposed to, ranging from the lowest to the 
highest percentiles of the respective distributions. We also analyze what would have 
happened if the significant variables related to political expedience (net seat gain and landed 
interest) had taken different values. For each variable, we determine its value at the 1st, 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentile of the distribution and use the relevant probit 
regression to compute the predicted probability that each MP would have voted for reform.28  
                                                            
House of Commons and in the House of Lords, newspaper reports and private letters, as well as secondary 
sources.  
28We use the results in Table 6, column 3 and Table 7, columns 4, 7 and 8. In Table A9 in the online appendix, 
we report the corresponding results for all protest, peaceful protest, meetings and gatherings. We do not report 
the results for the variables which were not statistically significant (violent unrest, rural violent, disenfranchised 
and patron controlled).  
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For each percentile of the distribution and each variable, Table 8 presents two sets of 
results: (i) the predicted share of English MPs who would have supported reform had they 
been exposed to various levels of violent urban unrest, reform agitation and petitions or 
political expediency and (ii) the predicted number of pro-reform English MPs. For each 
estimate, we also report 95% confidence intervals to quantify the precision of the estimates.29 
We recall that a minority of 229 (out of 466 present) English MPs actually voted for reform 
(see Table 1). Table 8, column 1 shows the results for the proxy for the threat of revolution, 
urban violent. This counterfactual scenario shows that, had the MPs been exposed to violent 
urban unrest in the 75th percentile of the distribution rather than in in the 25th, this would have 
persuaded (with 95 percent confidence) between eight and eleven more of them to support the 
reform bill and almost created a majority (49.81 percent) in favor of the reform amongst the 
English MPs. Table 8, columns 2 and 3 report the results for reform related agitation and 
lobbying. For reform agitation and petitions, a move from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile would have encouraged, on average, 3 and 10 more MPs to support the reform bill, 
respectively. It is, therefore, clear that urban violent unrest as a proxy for the threat of 
revolution as well as peaceful-reform related agitation and petitioning had a substantive effect 
on the outcome of the second reading and could have been pivotal.  
Table 8, columns 4 and 5 evaluate the importance of the two (statistically significant) 
variables, net seat gain and landed interest, related to political expedience. From Table 8, 
column 4, we see that if all constituencies had been located in a county that were to gain two 
extra seats (corresponding to the 75th percentile of the distribution of net seat gain), then a 
majority of 234 English MPs would have voted for the bill. Likewise, in Table 8, column 5, 
we see that had all constituencies enjoyed the benefit that the landed interest obtained from 
the new voting rules in the counties (corresponding to the 90th percentile of the distribution of 
                                                            
29 The standard errors are calculated with the delta method.  
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landed interest), 275 of the English MPs would have voted in favor of reform. Political 
expedience, thus, also had a substantive effect on the outcome of the vote. 
 In the second counterfactual scenario, we focus on the 18 absent English MPs and 
analyze what would have happened to the outcome of the vote if they had attended the second 
reading and voted on 22 March 1831. Based on the bibliographic information,30 we 
researched the reasons given for each MP's absence which we summarize in Table 9. The two 
most frequent reasons were (i) poor health and (ii) planned absence. To undertake the 
counterfactual calculation, we use the probit regression from Table 6, column 3 to predict 
how the 18 MPs, given their observable characteristics and those of their constituencies, 
would have voted had they been present. The last column of Table 9 reports for each MP the 
predicted probability that he would have voted for reform. Eight of the MPs were almost sure 
to vote yes with a predicted probability of doing so greater than 90 percent and five MPs 
were almost sure to vote no with a predicated probability of supporting the bill less than 10 
percent. Of the remaining five absent MPs, one would in all likelihood have voted yes (with a 
predicted probability of 87 percent), while the other four would most likely have voted no 
with probabilities of voting yes between 18 and 38 percent. It, thus, appears that the absent 
MPs would have split equally between yes and no and that it, therefore, did not matter for the 
outcome of the vote that they did not attend. It is, however, interesting to observe that out of 
the nine potentially pro-reform MPs, seven were Whigs and two were Tories. In fact, these 
two Tories have a high predicted probability of supporting reform: Bethell Walrond has a 87 
percent predicted probability of voting yes while that of Charles Vere Ferrars Compton 
                                                            
30The source for this information is Fisher (2009) and the material available online at 
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ (accessed 17 September 2017). We acknowledge that the reasons 
given in the bibliographical sources for the absence may contain some element of ex post rationalization and 
should be interpreted with that in mind. 
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Townshend is 98 percent.31 Likewise, one of the Whigs, William Henry Lytton, has a very 
low predicted probability of voting yes (only 2 percent). 
Interpretation 
We find strong evidence that the MPs reacted to public expressions of reform support, 
as suggested by the Public Opinion Hypothesis. Our empirical analysis suggests that two 
channels connected the MPs to public opinion. The first channel was direct and targeted 
lobbying via petitions from the MPs’ constituents about the reform question. This suggests 
that lobbying worked, not on every MP, but on a sufficiently large number to make a 
difference. The other channel is mass-mobilization for reform. Information about mass-
mobilization reached the MPs through their own participation in meetings and through 
frequent reports in the local and national press about meetings and demonstrations in their 
home county. Taken together, we conclude that the force of lobbying, agitation and public 
expressions of reform support were pivotal in pushing the reform bill over its first hurdle. 
Interests outside of parliament played a key role. 
In contrast and despite the rhetoric used by many MPs in the Parliamentary debate 
and the subsequent narrative of the Whig historians (e.g., McCarthy 1852; Trevelyan, 1920), 
our “horse race” tests suggest that the threat of revolution played a secondary role compared 
to public opinion. If anything, it was violent riots and demonstrations in London and in other 
urban areas rather than the rural Swing riots that made an impression. This does not mean 
that the threat of revolution was unimportant to the overall reform process: Aidt and Franck 
(2015) show that it did matter in relation to the April-June 1831 general election called 
                                                            
31 Table A8 in the online appendix reports a counterfactual analysis for the 18 absent MPs similar to the one we 
reported in Table 8 for the MPs present. We find that low levels of protest would have led nearly 60% of the 18 
absent MPs to support reform but only extreme levels of protest would have led all of them to support it had 
they been present.  
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shortly after the second reading where exposure to rural riots generated reform support 
amongst the electors of the Unreformed Parliament. However, our results suggest that the 
reform bill passed over its first hurdle, not so much because of fears of revolution, but thanks 
to the force of peaceful agitation and public expressions of reform support.  
The reform process played out against the backdrop of the economic transition to new 
manufacturing processes that started in the 1760s. In 1830, there was a new industrial elite 
which was poorly represented in the House of Commons, despite its economic power. This 
caused tension between the old landed elite and the new industrial elite, not only about 
political representation (Ansell and Samuels 2014) but also about trade and other economic 
policies (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991; 1994). Inside the Unreformed Parliament, however, our 
results related to political expedience suggest that this issue was resolved by the compromises 
embedded in the reform bill (in other words, more seats to the counties and new seats to the 
industrial heartland). This made room for a coalition between the MPs elected in the counties, 
who represented the landed interest, and the MPs elected in the industrial heartland, who 
represented the industrial interest. Our estimates show that both groups were more likely to 
support the second reading of the bill. The inter-sectoral coalition building can also be seen 
from the occupations of the pro- and anti-reform MPs. Table 10 shows simple mean 
comparison tests of the proportion of the MPs who voted for and against the bill across 
different occupational and landownership categories. We see that the proportion of MPs with 
a background in industry (industrialists) was twice as large amongst the supporters as 
amongst the opponents of the bill. At the same time, the share of landowners was also higher 
amongst the bill supporters. The anti-reform bloc, however, had a high proportion of MPs 
with a career in the army or in law. These results suggest that political expedience partly 




OMITTED FACTORS AND INDIRECT CHANNELS 
Our regression results suggest that public opinion, political expedience and to a lesser 
extent urban violent unrest directly influenced the MPs’ support for reform. We can plausibly 
rule out reverse causality since our sample of violent unrest, protests and petitions ends 
before the MPs voted on the reform, although for petitions there could be, as we discuss 
below, an anticipation effect. The main concern, therefore, is unobserved factors that could 
explain, at the same time, the spatial distribution of public protest of various types and 
petitions as well as the MPs’ position on the reform bill. Table A5 in the online appendix 
shows that including an additional set of potentially confounding factors does not affect our 
results. In this section, we discuss the possibility of indirect effects, anticipation effects, and 
conduct a placebo test to bolster the argument that the results are not due to unobserved 
omitted factors. 
 
Direct and indirect influences on the MPs' vote choices 
Tables 6 and 7 report estimates of the direct effect of violent unrest, peaceful protest 
and political expedience on the MPs’ votes. Support and opposition to the bill split, as noted 
above, along party lines, with the Whigs and Radicals being (mostly) in favor and the Tories 
being (mostly) against. The MPs who voted on the bill were elected in the 1830 general 
election. Unlike the election in 1831, parliamentary reform was not yet the major issue when 
the polling period ended in September 1830. It did play, however, some role in the agitation: 
the radical politician Henry Hunt stood unsuccessfully in Preston on a reform platform and 
some of the successful candidates, including Whig politician Henry Brougham, were 
committed to seek reform in the upcoming session (Brock 1973, Ch. 3; Tilly 1995, p. 324). It 
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is, therefore, possible that public protest before and during the electoral campaign induced 
some voters and patrons in areas strongly affected by protest or agitation to elect candidates 
from a particular party who subsequently happened to vote in a particular way on the Reform 
bill. If this were the case, public protest exerted an indirect influence on the vote and the 
evidence on the direct effect of public protest could reflect this.  
To investigate whether public protest and/or expectations of eventual gains and losses 
from parliamentary reform influenced the outcome of the 1830 election, we create the new 
dependent variable Whig share in 1830. It is equal to the share of seats in each constituency 
won by the Whigs or Radicals, in other words, the two parties which subsequently supported 
the Reform Bill. We also re-compute our measures of public protest so that they only include 
events which happened before the polling period of the 1830 General Election that started on 
29 July 1830. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A13 in the online appendix. 
Table 11 shows the results from three linear regressions relating Whig share in 1830 
to our recoded measures of protest, as well as to the variables capturing political expedience 
and the set of control variables. We find that neither violent unrest nor peaceful protest had 
any effect on the electoral outcome in 1830. With regard to political expedience, we see that 
net seat gain and disenfranchised are insignificant and landed interest is only marginally 
significant at the ten percent level. The variable Patron controlled is, however, significantly 
and negatively related to the share of elected Whigs. The places that were controlled by 
patrons tended to elect Tories, as previously noted. Overall, these results reinforce our 
interpretation of the main results as evidence that protest in its various forms had a direct 
effect on the vote choices of the MPs.  
Another concern is that petitions were submitted to MPs who were supporting the 
reform anyway. Since most Whig MPs voted for the reform, we would expect, if this concern 
is real, a positive correlation between the petitions for reform submitted (largely) after the 
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1830 election and the likelihood that a Whig (or Radical) candidate was elected in 1830. In 
Table 11, column 4, we report that the correlation between petitions and Whig share in 1830 
is insignificant, strongly suggesting that this was not the case. 
Protest in 1828-1831 and earlier reform attempts  
To further check that our results are not driven by omitted factors correlated with the 
geography of protests and with the general pro-reform attitudes of the patrons, voters and 
MPs in each constituency, we propose a falsification test. Its purpose is to assess whether 
public protests between 1828 and 1831 can predict the roll call votes on two earlier attempts 
at reform which failed to obtain a majority in the House of Commons. The attempts are the 
reform bills proposed by Thomas Brand, which was supported by 92 MPs on 21 May 1810 
(1807 Parliament), and by Lord John Russell, which was supported by 148 MPs on 25 April 
1822 (1820 Parliament). Since protests between 1828 and 1831 had not yet happened, they 
should not predict whether the MPs in 1810 and 1822 voted for reform.32   
To carry out the falsification test related to the failed attempts at reform in 1810 and 
1822, we estimate probit regressions similar to equation (1) but with the two new dependent 
variables yes vote 1810 and yes vote 1822 which are equal to one if the MP elected in a given 
constituency supported the reform bill in 1810 or 1822, respectively, and zero otherwise. To 
match the control variables to the relevant time periods, we collect data on the party 
affiliations of the MPs who represented each English constituency in the 1807 and 1820 
                                                            
32We selected these two bills because they received the largest number of favorable votes in the two decades 
before the Great Reform Act (Cannon, 1973). The yes votes are reported in Hansard, House of Commons, 1810 
(vol. 15) and Hansard, House of Commons, 1822 (vol. 7). For all the failed attempts at reform during the 19th 
century, only the votes in favor of reform are recorded in the Journals of the House of Commons. Therefore, our 
test can only be carried out for the two attempts in 1810 and 1822 which gathered a sufficiently large number of 
votes in favor of reform.  
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Parliaments. We also re-compute the patronage index by assessing whether there was an 
actual contest in the last seven general elections prior to the 1807 or 1822 general election 
and use information from the 1811 and 1821 Censuses to construct emp. Herfindahl index 
and population density. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A14 in the online 
appendix. Table 12 shows the results. It is reassuring to observe that neither public protest 
between 1828 and 1831, whether violent or not, nor reform petitions predict support for 
reform amongst the MPs in 1810 and 1822. These results provide additional support for our 
interpretation that the effect of public protest on the second reading of the bill is causal rather 
than co-incidental. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study of the 22 March 1831 roll call vote on parliamentary reform adds to the 
understanding of the historical process of democratization in three ways. First, in between the 
view that democratization was an elite project devised for opportunistic reasons and the view 
that democracy was unwillingly conceded by the elite to avoid a revolution, there is a third 
possibility which has received too little attention in the historical discourse on 
democratization, with the notable exception of the pioneering work by Tilly (1995, 2007). 
This possibility is that peaceful protest and demonstrations, agitations, petitioning and other 
public expressions of opinion might influence the views and attitudes of the elite politicians 
who contemplate reform without necessarily stoking fears of a violent revolution. In 
particular, politicians may be influenced by demands from the population at large (e.g., a 
large peaceful demonstration), from meetings with their constituents, or from organized 
special interest groups (e.g., lobbying by a reform society) and persuaded that reform is 
needed and desirable. This sort of mass-led, non-violent mobilization was instrumental in 
bringing about democratization in several countries in South Asia, Eastern Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa in the last 30 years (e.g., Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Chenoweth and Stephan 
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2009, 2011). However, there is, as far as we know, no quantitative historical evidence on 
mass-led democratization. Building on the work by Tilly (1995), our study provides such 
evidence. We are able to distinguish between peaceful and violent protest and thus between 
agitation and revolutionary threats. We find that peaceful protest and reform related petitions 
exerted an important influence on the MPs’ vote, giving reason to reassess the importance of 
mass mobilisation and lobbying for democratic reform. The threat of revolution was stoked 
by urban (and not rural) social unrest but was less important than peaceful reform related 
agitation and lobbying for the result of the roll call vote. 
Second, the study provides new evidence on the importance of political expedience. 
We follow the approach pioneered by Ziblatt (2008) and use the details of the reform 
proposal which disenfranchised many borough constituencies, granted representation to all 
the large industrial towns, and allocated more seats to the counties to measure the expected 
gains and losses for individual MPs. We find that MPs elected in borough constituencies 
located in counties that stood to gain representation as well as those representing the counties 
and the landed interest supported the bill.  
Third, franchise reforms are the outcome of complex political processes and multiple 
hurdles have to be overcome for success. The Great Reform Act is no exception, as it had to 
overcome at least five such hurdles at each of which it could have failed (e.g., Brock 1973). 
The fact that there were multiple hurdles points to the possibility that different “causes” – 
political expedience, agitations and mass mobilization, or threats of revolution – may all play 
a role but with different intensities at different points in the process. In this paper, we study 
one of the hurdles that the Great Reform Act had to pass – the roll call vote in March 1831 – 
and find that peaceful reform related agitation and lobbying played a leading role. In contrast, 
Aidt and Franck (2015) study another of these hurdles – the general election in April-June 
1831 – and find strong causal evidence that the threat of revolution as measured by voters’ 
46 
exposure to rural riots was instrumental in returning the large Whig majority needed to move 
the reform process on. This specific example carries with it the more general lesson that 
different causal mechanisms can be at play at different points during a reform process. This 
observation not only help resolve why micro-historical studies of the same reform process 
often arrive at apparently contradicting conclusions, but also explains why particular reforms 
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THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ROLL CALL VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 22 
MARCH 1831, ON THE SECOND READING OF THE REFORM BILL 
 














Yes 188 37 4 229 14 69 312 10 302 
No 8 229 0 237 10 64 311 10 301 
Absent 9 9 0 18 0 9 27   
Vacancies 1 3 0 4 0 3 7   
Speaker  1  1   1   
Total 206 279 4 489 24 145 658   
 
Note: The category “absent” includes the MPs who could have been present but were not. The category 
“vacancies” refers to seats where a by-election was due. The seats were Evenham (both seats vacant due to 
bribery), Colchester (one ineligible elected) and Durham City (one ineligible elected), Nairnshire in Scotland 
(vacated) and Clare (one ineligible elected) and Londonderry (one ineligible elected) in Ireland. The party 
affiliation refers to the MPs elected in 1830. The Speaker (a Tory, elected in Scarborough) abstained. Eight MPs 
were paired off and two MPs were appointed Tellers on each side of the issue.  
Source: Hansard (1831, vol 2, p. 719-826) contains the division list reporting all votes cast. The party affiliations 
of the English MPs are constructed from information in Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES USED IN THE MAIN ANALYSIS 
 
 Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
  
 Seat-Level Variation 
Support for parliamentary reform      
Yes vote (Second Reading of Great Reform Act) 466 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Members of Parliament      
Whig/Radical 485 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Age (of MP) 485 44.9 13.1 21 79 
Army Career 485 0.19 0.39 0 1 
   
 County-Level Variation 
Public protest participants      
All protest (10,000s) 489 3.60 5.88 0.001 25.9 
Violent unrest (10,000s) 489 0.26 0.43 0 2.98 
Peaceful protest (10,000s) 489 3.34 5.68 0.001 25.6 
Rural violent (10,000s) 489 0.11 0.21 0 0.83 
Urban violent (10,000s) 489 0.15 0.41 0 2.98 
Meetings (10,000s) 489 1.61 2.93 0.001 16.3 
Gatherings (10,000s) 489 1.72 4.20 0 21.1 
Reform agitation (10,000s)  489 0.71 2.12 0 15.1 
      
Expected consequences of reform      
Net seat gain  489 -4.01 9.51 -28 12 
Institutional controls      
Local newspapers 489 16.6 62.3 0 303 
  
 Constituency-Level Variation 
      
Public protest      
Petitions 489 1.46 2.83 -2 27 
Expected consequences of reform      
Disenfranchised 489 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Patron controlled 489 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Landed interest 489 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Demographic and economic controls      
Emp. Herfindahl index 489 0.76 0.073 0.24 0.86 
Population density 489 5.58 0.84 3.92 9.79 
Distance to London (inverse) 489 0.02 0.11 0.002 0.88 
      
 
Note: The sample is restricted to the 489 English seats. The statistics for the MPs exclude the four unpresented 





THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROTEST BY MAJOR 
REGIONS, 1 JANUARY 1828 - 22 MARCH 1831. 
 All 
protest 













Southeast 154,023 20,507 73.4 26.6 133,516 48.3 51.7 10.5 
East Anglia 45,181 7,293 37.5 62.5 37,888 71.8 28.2 15.8 
Midlands 252,853 16,306 3.3 96.7 236,547 46 54 70.8 
Southwest 133,721 6,623 94.3 5.7 127,098 32.6 67.4 7.6 
North 374,192 14,519 0 100 359,673 38.7 61.3 26.4 
London 239,294 29,756 0 100 209,538 77.9 22.1 20.3 
Wales 3,142 40 0 100 3,102 25.1 74.9 2.9 
All participants 1,202,406 95,044 25.9 74.1 1,107,362 49.2 50.8 30.2 
All events 2,726 546 39.0 .061  2180 87.5 12.5 18.3 
Ave. participation 441 174 630 1155 508 286 2068 836 
 
Note: Southeast includes Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey and Sussex; 
Southwest includes Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire and Monmouthshire; East 
Anglia includes Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk and Suffolk; 
Midlands includes Derbyshire, Herefordshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Rutland, Salop, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, and Worcestershire; North includes Cheshire, Cumberland, Durham, 
Lancashire, Northumberland, Westmorland, and Yorkshire; London includes the City of London, Westminster 
and Middlesex; Wales includes all the counties of Wales. All protest is equal to violent unrest plus peaceful 
protest; meetings and gatherings sum to peaceful protest and rural and urban violent sum to violent unrest. Reform 
agitation is reform-related peaceful events (and expressed in percentage of peaceful protest). Total events record 
the number of protest events and ave. participation is the number of participants per protest. The number of 
participants involved in the protest is calculated from Horn and Tilly (1988)’s best estimate and for those protests 
where they do not have an estimate, we assume that 10 people were involved (this is the cut-off for being included 
in their database).  























Disenfranchised -0.363***       
Patron controlled -0.228*** 0.281***      
Landed interest 0.175*** -0.243*** -0.108**     
Whig\Radical 0.131*** -0.184*** -0.191*** 0.097**    
Local newspapers 0.099** 0.019 -0.158*** 0.006 0.051   
Emp. Herfindahl index 0.092** -0.224*** -0.120*** 0.314*** 0.033 0.020  
Population density -0.011 -0.091** -0.139*** -0.062 -0.021 0.308*** 0.066 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.  
Note: Calculated for the sample of 489 English constituencies.  
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TABLE 5 
TEST OF MEANS DIFFERENCES IN CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS BY 
PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE ELECTED MP 
  
 Tory Whig/Radical P-value 
Public Protest      
All Protest 3.49 [0.34] 3.74 [0.42] 0.64 
Violent Unrest 0.24 [0.021] 0.30 [0.036] 0.13 
Peaceful Unrest  3.25 [0.34] 3.45 [0.40] 0.71 
Rural Violent  0.13 [0.014] 0.094 [0.012] 0.07 
Urban Violent  0.11 [0.018] 0.20 [0.036] 0.01 
Meetings  1.42 [0.15] 1.88 [0.24] 0.09 
Gatherings  1.84 [0.26] 1.57 [0.27] 0.49 
Petitions 1.20 [0.16] 1.80 [0.21] 0.02 
Reform Agitation  0.69 [0.12] 0.75 [0.15] 0.72 
Expected Consequences of Reform     
Neat Seat Gain -5.09 [0.60] -2.58 [0.60] 0.004 
Disenfranchised 0.29 [0.027] 0.14 [0.024] 0.000 
Patron controlled 0.83 [0.022] 0.67 [0.033] 0.000 
Landed interest 0.14 [0.021] 0.21 [0.028] 0.03 
Institutional Controls      
Local Newspapers 13.85 [3.35] 20.21 [4.82] 0.26 
Demographic and economic controls     
Emp Herfindahl Index 0.76 [0.005] 0.76 [0.005] 0.47 
Population density 5.59 [0.049] 5.56 [0.061] 0.65 
Distance to London (Inverse) 0.014 [0.004] 0.038 [0.010] 0.02 
 
Note: The table reports average and standard errors (in square brackets) for the subsamples of the 489 English 
seats identifying with the Tory and the Whig/Radical parties, respectively. We were 279 Tories and 210 
Whigs/Radicals. The last column reports the p-value associated with a t-test of the null hypothesis that the means 
of the two subsamples are different.  
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TABLE 6 
THE PROBABILITY THAT A MP VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE REFORM BILL ON 22 MARCH 1831: PROBIT AND HECKMAN-PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Dependent variable  Yes vote     Present 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
    Incl. Wales Heckman-Prob  Selection 
All protest 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016  -0.34 
 (0.0067)** (0.0074)** (0.0071)** (0.0072)** (0.0071)**  (0.14)** 
Net seat gain  0.0074 0.0066 0.0071 0.0073 0.0053  0.0029 
 (0.0035)** (0.0038)* (0.0038)* (0.0039)* (0.0037)  (0.011) 
Disenfranchised -0.066 -0.090 -0.099 -0.099 -0.068  -0.44 
 (0.080) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.075)  (0.35) 
Patron controlled -0.084 -0.11 -0.10 -0.072 -0.080  -0.57 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.098) (0.090)  (0.33)* 
Landed interest 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.24  -0.07 
 (0.070)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.062)*** (0.060)***  (0.27) 
Whig/Radical 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81  -0.30 
 (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)***  (0.17)* 
Local newspapers   -0.00013 -0.00020 -0.00015 -0.00028  0.0027 
  (0.00032) (0.00029) (0.00032) (0.00027)  (0.0011)** 
Emp. Herfindahl index  -1.03 -1.18 -1.07 -1.05  0.69 
  (0.51)** (0.53)** (0.52)** (0.46)**  (0.95) 
Population density  -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 -0.030  0.070 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035)  (0.14) 
Army career   -0.16 -0.11 -0.10  -0.57 
   (0.087)* (0.087) (0.074)  (0.21)*** 
Distance (inverse)       18.0 
       (11.9) 
Age of MP        0.062 
       (0.034)* 
Age of MP (squared)        -0.00076 
       (0.00038)** 
Observations 466 466 466 490 484  484 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note: Cols. (1)-(4) report probit estimates of the probability that a MP voted yes. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables are shown. Constant not shown. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the county level. In cols. (1)-(3) the sample is the English MPs who were present in the House of Commons on 22 March 1831, and in col. (4), the Welsh MPs are 
included. Col. (5) reports Heckman-Probit estimates for the 484 English MPs who could have voted (marginal effects reported). Col. (5) reports the selection equation; the outcome variable present is 
coded one if the MP was present and zero otherwise. The Wald test of independence between the selection and outcome equation is associated with a p-value =0.0001. We therefore reject that the two 
equation are independent and selection may be an issue. 
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TABLE 7 
THE EFFECT OF VIOLENT AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF PEACEFUL PROTEST ON A MP'S PROBABILITY OF VOTING IN FAVOR 
OF THE REFORM BILL: PROBIT ESTIMATES 
 
Dependent Var.    Yes vote  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Violent unrest  0.11         
  (0.11)         
Peaceful protest   0.016        
   (0.0075)**        
Rural violent     -0.19      -0.20 
    (0.15)      (0.16) 
Urban violent      0.24     0.055 
     (0.081)***     (0.13) 
Meetings      0.021     
      (0.0099)**     
Gatherings       0.017    
       (0.0098)*    
Reform agitation        0.025  0.019 
        (0.0094)***  (0.011)* 
Petitions         0.027 0.023 
         (0.0069)*** (0.013)* 
Net seat gain  0.011 0.0070 0.0100 0.0098 0.0087 0.0088 0.0094 0.012 0.0087 
  (0.0028)*** (0.0039)* (0.0033)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0036)** (0.0032)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0042)** 
Disenfranchised  -0.080 -0.100 -0.081 -0.078 -0.095 -0.092 -0.085 -0.039 -0.045 
  (0.088) (0.090) (0.087) (0.089) (0.091) (0.087) (0.088) (0.090) (0.097) 
Patron controlled  -0.096 -0.10 -0.10 -0.080 -0.091 -0.11 -0.097 -0.076 -0.064 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Landed interest  0.25 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 
  (0.066)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.067)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 466 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note: Probit estimates. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. 
Sample restricted to the English MPs who were present in the House of Commons on 22 March 1831. Peaceful protest is sum of Meetings and Gatherings. Violent unrest is 
the sum of rural violent and urban violent. Controls included are Whig/radical, Local newspapers, Emp. Herfindahl index, Population density and Army career. When tested 





COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEVELS OF PROTEST AND CONSTITUENCIES' CHARACTERISTICS ON THE MPS' VOTES 
 
 
Note: This table reports results for a counterfactual analysis where we use the results in cols. 4, 7 and 8 of Table 7 for urban violent, reform agitation, and petitions, and the results in cols. 3 in Table 6 
for net seat gain and landed interest. For each variable, we determine its value at the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentile of the distribution, and using the relevant regression we report the 
predicted probability that the 466 MPs would have voted for reform (with 95 percent confidence intervals in curly brackets). Standard errors for the predicted values are reported in square brackets. 
 
































of English MPs 
1st 47.68% 222 48.14% 224 45.61% 213 42.78% 199 47.08% 219 
 [0.015] {208;236} [0.014] {211;238} [0.017] {197;228} [0.032] {170;228} [0.014] {207;232} 
10th 47.68% 222 48.14% 224 47.50% 221 45.65% 213 47.08% 219 
 [0.015] {209;236} [0.014] {211;238} [0.014] {208;234} [0.020] {195;231} [0.014] {207;232} 
25th 47.70% 222 48.15% 224 47.50% 221 47.90% 223 47.08% 219 
 [0.015] {209;236} [0.014] {211;238} [0.014] {208;234} [0.013] {211;235} [0.014] {207;232} 
50th 47.75% 223 48.38% 225 48.47% 226 49.48% 231 47.08% 219 
 [0.015] {209;236} [0.014] {212;238} [0.014] {213;239} [0.013] {218;243} [0.014] {207;232} 
75th 49.81% 232 48.62% 227 49.47% 231 50.29% 234 47.08% 219 
 [0.013] {220;244} [0.014] {214;239} [0.014] {218;243} [0.015] {220;248} [0.014] {207;232} 
90th 51.30% 239 48.91% 228 50.50% 235 51.12% 238 59.03% 275 
 [0.014] {226;252} [0.014] {215;241} [0.015] {222;249} [0.018] {222;255} [0.032] {246;304} 
99th 82.16% 383 65.03% 303 54.89% 256 53.14% 248 59.03% 275 
  [0.103] {288;477} [0.070] {240;367} [0.024] {234;278} [0.028] {222;273} [0.032] {246;304} 
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TABLE 9 
ABSENCE FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 22 MARCH 1831 
Borough County MP Affiliation Occupation Reason for absence Prob reform 
support 
Brackley Northamptonshire Robert Haldane 
Bradshaw 
Tory Industrialist On 22 November 1830, he was granted a month’s leave because 
of ill health and was given another month on 10 February 1831.  
0.08 
Brackley Northamptonshire James Bradshaw Tory Army 
Officer 
His father was ill (see above) and without any additional 
information, we speculate that he remained with him during this 
illness.  
0.03 
Derbyshire Derbyshire George Augustus 
Henry Cavendish 
Whig Landowner He was apparently too ill to attend the House on 22 March 1831. 0.99 
Dunwich Suffolk Frederick Barne Tory Army 
Officer 
On 10 February 1831, he received a month’s leave of absence on 
account of ill health and remained absent on 22 March 1831, even 
though the reform bill proposed Dunwich's disfranchisement. 
0.21 




On March 7th, 1831, he was excused from attending the Durham 
election committee because of illness and was absent from the 
division on the second reading of the ministry’s reform bill 15 
days later. 
0.91 




In March 1831, he informed his patron, Northumberland, who 
wished him to oppose the government's reform bill, that it was 
'quite impossible for me as the senior officer upon the King’s staff 
to vote against His Majesty's government under any circumstances 
whatever', and that he could only promise to 'keep away from the 
discussion'. He was absent from the vote on 22 March 1831, was 
then given 'notice to quit' and he eventually resigned his seat on 5 
April 1831. 
0.02 
Midhurst Sussex George Smith Whig Banker  On 22 March 1831, he was ill but he made it known that he would 
have voted for it if present. 
0.97 
Newton Lancashire Thomas Legh Tory Landowner On 14 February 1831, he was granted three weeks’ leave, 
following his wife’s death, and on 9 March 1831, another fortnight 
because of illness in his family. He did not vote on the second 











Newtown Hampshire  Hudson Gurney Whig Banker  He was plagued by a cold and did not vote. He, however, indicated 
two days later in a debate that he had actually voted in favor of the 
bill. 
0.90 
Pontefract Yorkshire Culling Eardley Smith Whig Landowner On 7 March 1831, after serving on an election committee, he was 
granted a month’s leave to attend to private business. 
0.18 
Sudbury Suffolk Bethell Walrond Tory Army 
Officer 
On 16 March 1831, he was granted a ten-day leave to attend the 
assizes. 
0.87 
Sussex Sussex Walter Burrell Whig Landowner On 14 March 1831, after serving on an election committee, he was 
granted a two-week leave to attend to private business. 
0.38 
Tamworth Staffordshire Charles Vere Ferrars 
Compton Townshend 
Tory Landowner No reason given as to his absence from the division on the second 
reading of the Grey ministry’s reform bill on 22 March 1831. 
0.98 
Thirsk Yorkshire Robert Frankland Whig Landowner No reason given as to his absence from the division on the second 
reading of the Grey ministry’s reform bill on 22 March 1831. 
0.99 
Weobly Herefordshire Edward Thynne Tory Army 
Officer 
An army officer on active service, he was returned in abstentia, 
rarely attended Parliament and let his younger brother Edward sit 
for the borough in April 1831.  
0.05 




Bulwer was a Whig beholden to the Tory patron of Wilton, which 
was scheduled to lose a Member because of the reform. This may 
have led him not to vote on the second reading of the bill on 22 
March 1831, after rumors began to circulate on 5 March that he 
had joined the ranks of the Tory opposition. 
0.02 
Winchelsea Sussex John Williams Whig Lawyer On 22 March 1831, he was working on the legal circuit. 0.93 




On 14 March 1831, he was excused because of illness, which also 
prevented him from voting on 22 March 1831. 
0.94 
 
Note: This table lists the MPs who did not attend the vote on 22 March 1831, along with their affiliation and stated reason of absence based on the information in Fisher (2009). It 
also reports a counterfactual analysis where we compute each MP's predicted probability of voting for reform from the Probit regression in column 3 of Table 6, using the MPs' 
observable characteristics and those of their constituencies. Table A7 in the online appendix reports the reason why the four vacant seats were vacant. 
 
TABLE 10 
THE OCCUPATIONS OF THE MPS: MEAN COMPARISON TESTS OF THE PROPORTION OF 
MPS VOTING YES AND NO 
 
  No vote Yes vote t-t est 
 mean  %  mean  %  p-value 
    
Army career 20.1 15.7 0.08 
Financier 5.0 6.1 0.31 
Industrialist 3.4 7.0 0.04 
Jurist 15.6 9.1 0.02 
Merchant 8.4 10.0 0.28 
Landowner 42.1 49.0 0.08 
 
Note: The table reports the results of one-sided t-tests for mean differences in the percentage of MPs within different 
occupational and landownership categories. The p-values are for the test of the larger mean being bigger than the 





THE EFFECT OF PROTEST AND POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE ON THE SHARE OF WHIGS 
AND RADICALS ELECTED IN THE 1830 GENERAL ELECTION: OLS ESTIMATES 
 
Dependent variable  Whig share in 1830 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
All protesta  0.29    
 [0.38]    
Violent unresta   8.12   
  [7.29]   
Peaceful protesta    0.28  
   [0.39]  
Petitionsb    0.54 
    [0.85] 
Net seat gain 0.019 -0.0075 0.022 0.057 
 [0.10] [0.11] [0.10] [0.095] 
Local newspapers -0.019 -0.023 -0.019 -0.022 
 [0.011]* [0.011]** [0.011]* [0.015] 
Whig share in 1826 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
 [0.046]*** [0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.045]*** 
Landed interest 8.56 8.43 8.56 8.39 
 [4.77]* [4.76]* [4.77]* [4.71]* 
Disenfranchised -8.28 -8.21 -8.27 -7.43 
 [5.90] [5.92] [5.89] [6.53] 
Patron controlled -8.08 -7.91 -8.11 -7.87 
 [3.46]** [3.48]** [3.45]** [3.37]** 
Emp. Herfindahl index -12.5 -11.1 -12.6 -10.9 
 [25.4] [26.5] [25.4] [25.0] 
Population density 0.22 0.57 0.23 0.20 
 [1.79] [1.68] [1.80] [1.76] 
     
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Observations 244 244 244 244 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note: Linear regressions estimated with OLS. Constant not reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the county level. Sample restricted to the 244 English constituencies. a. the variables are recoded and accumulate 
protest events before 29 July 1830. b. all but ten petitions were submitted after the 1830 election. Descriptive statistics 




FALSIFICATION TEST. THE EFFECT OF PROTEST IN 1828-31 ON ROLL CALL VOTES 
RELATED TO THE FAILED REFORM BILLS OF 1810 AND 1822: PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Dependent variable Yes vote 1810 Yes vote 1822 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Violent unrest 0.013   -0.045   
 (0.031)   (0.059)   
Peaceful protest  -0.0038   -0.0053  
  (0.0027)   (0.0035)  
Petitions   0.0052   -0.0080 
   (0.0061)   (0.011) 
Net seat gain 0.0028 0.0035 0.0029 0.0060 0.0071 0.0058 
 (0.0014)** (0.0017)** (0.0014)** (0.0018)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0018)*** 
Disenfranchised -0.023 -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 -0.012 -0.030 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) 
Uncontested elections  -0.050 -0.051 -0.048 0.069 0.069 0.061 
 (0.027)* (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) 
Landed interest 0.036 0.029 0.039 0.092 0.089 0.090 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Whig/Radical 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.57 0.57 0.57 
 (0.044)*** (0.042)*** (0.043)*** (0.042)*** (0.042)*** (0.042)*** 
Local newspapers 0.00015 0.00029 0.00011 0.00030 0.00021 0.00025 
 (0.00015) (0.00014)** (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00028) (0.00026) 
Emp. Herf. Index 0.066 0.055 0.078 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Population density 0.0059 0.0082 0.0050 -0.020 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
       
Observations 486 486 486 487 487 487 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Note: Probit estimator. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Constants not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Sample restricted to the English MPs. Uncontested 
elections refers to the seven previous elections; Emp. Herf. index and population density refer to the nearest census 
year. Only yes votes recorded. MPs who did not vote are assumed to vote no. Descriptive statistics reported in Table 
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Figure 1: The timeline of the main events as the bill passes through the political process. 
 
              The hurdles 
  
Figure 2a. All Protest. 
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Figure 2b. Violent Protest 
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Figure 2c. Peaceful Protest 
 
FIGURE 2 
 PUBLIC PROTEST IN ENGLISH AND WELSH COUNTIES BY NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, 
1 JANUARY 1828 - 22 MARCH 1831. 






VIOLENT UNREST AND PEACEFUL PROTEST, 1830-1831 
Note: These figures display the number of monthly protests in England and Wales between January1830 
and April 1831. The solid line, measured on the right-hand y-axis graphs participation in peaceful protest 
(meetings and gatherings) while the dotted line, measured on the left-hand y-axis graphs participation in 
violent urban and rural unrest.  
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WHAT MOTIVATES AN OLIGARCHIC ELITE TO DEMOCRATIZE? EVIDENCE FROM THE ROLL 
CALL VOTE ON THE GREAT REFORM ACT OF 1832 
TOKE S. AIDT AND RAPHAËL FRANCK 
In this appendix, we provide some supplementary evidence in support of our 
interpretation of the econometric results reported in the main text, additional information about 
how we coded the variable related to newspaper circulation, historical evidence on the three 
hypothesizes, and a list of the definitions and sources of all the variables we use in the analysis.  
The additional evidence includes the following. First, we show that our results are robust 
to using alternative definitions of the key variables. Second, we show that the results are similar 
when London is excluded from the sample. Third, we show that including additional control 
variables does not affect our results. We also show that the personal circumstances of the MPs 
(their age, occupation, education, and so on) cannot explain their vote behavior. Fourth, we 
report the correlation matrix for the variables related to violent unrest and public opinion. Fifth, 
we present evidence from the bibliographical literature on the reasons why the 18 absent 
English MPs were not present for the vote and a counterfactual analysis on their predicted vote 
had they been present based on observables. Finally, we report probit IV estimates of the effect 
of protest on the MPs’ votes. Descriptive statistics for the new variables used in the appendix 
are reported in Tables A11 to A14.  
A1. Alternative definitions of the key variables 
Tables A1 and A2 show that the main results are robust to three alternative definitions 
of the variable capturing public protest: these are the number of protest events (rather than the 
number of participants), participants per capita and per adult male. Table A1 shows that the 
results for all protest are robust to these permutations, to an alternative measure of net seat gain 
which computes the gain in percentage rather than as the absolute value, and to normalizing 
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newspaper circulation by population. Table A2 reproduces Table 6 with the public protest 
variables defined as the number of events rather than as the number of participants. 
 
Table A1: Robustness checks. The effect of protest on a MP’s vote in favor of the reform bill: 
Probit estimates under alternative definitions of key variables 
Dependent variable  Yes vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
All protest (#events)a 0.072     
 (0.023)***     
All protest (par. per capita)b  0.47    
  (0.16)***    
All protest (par. per adult male)b   0.14 0.13 0.23 
   (0.045)*** (0.043)*** (0.054)*** 
Net seat gain 0.010 0.011 0.011  0.011 
 (0.0031)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0028)***  (0.0027)*** 
Net seat gain (%)    0.0022  
    (0.0010)**  
Disenfranchised -0.086 -0.074 -0.075 -0.089 -0.079 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
Patron controlled -0.095 -0.077 -0.076 -0.077 -0.080 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Landed interest 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 
 (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)*** 
Whig/radical 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 
 (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** 
Local newspapers -0.00070 -0.00072 -0.00072 -0.00060  
 (0.00022)*** (0.00039)* (0.00039)* (0.00041)  
Local newspapers per capita     -0.0041 
     (0.0014)*** 
Emp. Herfindahl index -1.19 -1.21 -1.20 -1.22 -1.19 
 (0.50)** (0.51)** (0.51)** (0.51)** (0.52)** 
Population density -0.011 -0.016 -0.019 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) 
Army career -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
 (0.087)* (0.086)* (0.087)* (0.087)* (0.087)* 
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 
 
Note: Probit estimator. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Sample restricted to the English MPs, present in the House of 
Commons on 22 March 1831 and who voted. a. all protest is the number of protest events; b. all protest is the 
number of participants in all protest events between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 




Table A2. Alternative coding of protest data and net seat gain variable. Probit estimates. 
  
Dependent Var.    Yes vote  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
 All protest           0.015 
           (0.0066)** 
Violent unrest (#events)a  0.19          
  (0.14)          
Peaceful protest (#events) a   0.098         
   (0.026)***         
Rural violent (#events)a    -0.039      -0.16  
    (0.29)      (0.34)  
Urban violent (#events)a     0.33     -0.28  
     (0.094)***     (0.34)  
Meetings (#events)a      0.11      
      (0.030)***      
Gatherings (#events)a       0.54     
       (0.22)**     
Reform agitation (#events)a        0.83  0.91  
        (0.30)***  (0.52)*  
Petitions         0.027 0.024  
         (0.0069)*** (0.016)  
 Net seat gain proposal           0.011 
           (0.0035)*** 
Net seat gain  0.012 0.0098 0.011 0.010 0.0097 0.011 0.0094 0.012 0.010  
  (0.0026)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0036)***  
Disenfranchised  -0.081 -0.088 -0.082 -0.079 -0.089 -0.083 -0.096 -0.039 -0.061 -0.079 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.086) (0.089) (0.090) (0.097) (0.089) 
Patron controlled  -0.099 -0.095 -0.11 -0.092 -0.095 -0.099 -0.097 -0.076 -0.080 -0.088 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Landed interest  0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 
  (0.066)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)*** (0.066)*** 
Note: Probit estimates. The same controls as in Table 7 are included. Each regression has 466 observations. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Constant not 
shown. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Sample restricted to the English MPs who were present in the House of Commons on 22 March 1831. a. defined as the 
number of protest events (rather than the number of participants) Peaceful protest is sum of Meetings and Gatherings. Violent unrest is the sum of rural violent and urban violent. Controls 
included are Whig/radical, Local newspapers, Emp. Herfindahl index, Population density and Army career. When tested down by a general-to-specific algorithm, petition is significant at the 1 
percent level in col. (9). b. Net seat gain proposal is coded from the seat distribution included in the schedules A to G in the draft bill presented in March 1831. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A2: Results without London 
Being the capital, London, was at the center of public protest and agitation during the period. 
This motivates studying two samples: one where we consider all the English MPs (the full 
sample considered in the text) and one where we exclude the MPs elected in the City of London, 
in Westminster and in the county of Middlesex (which we henceforth refer to as London). Table 
A3 reproduces Table 6 for the sample without London. We observe that the results are less 




Table A3. The effect of different types of violent and peaceful protest on a MP's probability of voting in favor of the reform bill: Probit estimates excluding 
London. 
Dependent Var.   Yes vote  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   
Violent unrest 0.045          
 (0.18)          
Peaceful protest  0.015         
  (0.0077)*         
Rural violent    -0.19      -0.21  
   (0.15)      (0.16)  
Urban violent    0.35     0.25  
    (0.19)*     (0.23)  
Meetings     0.016      
     (0.011)      
Gatherings      0.017     
      (0.0097)*     
Reform agitation       0.023  0.011  
       (0.0098)**  (0.012)  
Petitions        0.044 0.048  
        (0.019)** (0.020)**  
Net seat gain 0.012 0.0074 0.010 0.0091 0.0094 0.0090 0.0097 0.012 0.0084  
 (0.0028)*** (0.0040)* (0.0034)*** (0.0036)** (0.0037)** (0.0033)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0042)**  
Disenfranchised -0.077 -0.095 -0.075 -0.082 -0.089 -0.086 -0.079 -0.019 -0.016  
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.088) (0.092) (0.097)  
Patron controlled -0.092 -0.095 -0.089 -0.082 -0.087 -0.10 -0.086 -0.071 -0.054  
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Landed interest 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26  
 (0.067)*** (0.066)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.068)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)***  
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Observations 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458  
 
Note: The eight MPs from the City of London, Westminster and the county of Middlesex are excluded. Probit estimates. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. 
Constant not shown. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Sample restricted to the English MPs who were present in the House of Commons on 22 March 1831. 
Peaceful protest is sum of Meetings and Gatherings. Violent unrest is the sum of rural violent and urban violent. Controls included are Whig/radical, Local newspapers, Emp. Herfindahl index, 
Population density and Army career. When tested down by a general-to-specific algorithm, petition is significant at the 5 percent level and reform agitation is significant at the 5 percent level in 
col. (9). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A3. Additional control variables and MP characteristics 
We collected information on the personal characteristics of the English MPs that were 
elected in July 1830 to the House of Commons. The main source is Fisher, David (ed.), 2009, 
The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1820-1832, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009 and the material from http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ 
(accessed 17 September 2017). The characteristics relate to the MPs’ occupation, age, education, 
and years served in parliament, as well as whether they had taken a Grand Tour, were part of a 
dynasty that returned MPs generation after generation or had relatives in the current parliament. 
In the results reported in the main body of the paper, we only include one of these characteristics, 
army career. The reason is that none of the other characteristics can predict the voting behavior, 
neither individually, in groups or altogether. Table A4 reports representative results. We observe 
that the effect of the variables of interest (all protest) and the variables related to political 
expedience are not affected by the inclusion or not of the personal characteristics. 
We examine the robustness of the results in Table 5, column 3 to the inclusion of 
additional potentially confounding factors. Some of these variables can be viewed as endogenous 
to the intensity of public protest which motivates their exclusion from the baseline analysis. The 
variables pertain to economic and demographic characteristics from the 1831 Population Census, 
including employment shares (Agriculture (emp. share), Trade (emp. share), and Professionals 
(emp. share)), two indicator variables coded from the contextual information in Philbin (1965), 
capturing whether the constituency was thriving or declining in 1830 (Thriving economy and 
Declining economy), an index of the county-level wealth distribution (Top wealth, high wealth 
and medium wealth) based on a 1815 property value survey and reported in the 1831 Population 
Census33, and two features of the suffrage rules captured by a separate indicator for the university 
                                                            
33These data are reported in the 1831 Population Census in the table “Population. Comparative account of the 
population of Great Britain in the years 1801, 1811, 1821 and 1831 (348).” They were collected for the purpose of 
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seats (university) and an indicator variable indicating whether the suffrage in each borough 
constituency was narrow or broad (Narrow franchise). Table A5 reports the results when we add 
these variables to our preferred specification from Table 5, column 3. We find that none of these 
variables is significant. More importantly, including them neither modifies the size and 
significance of public protests on the MPs' vote nor affects our conclusions regarding political 
expedience. 
                                                            
levying taxes. While the parish level data may contain measurement error, the county averages are likely to give a 
fairly accurate estimate of the county differences in average property values. To reduce measurement error, we 
divide the counties into three groups rather than using the average property values directly.  
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Table A4: The relationship between personal characteristics and the probability that an MP voted in 
favor of the reform bill on 22 March 1831: Probit estimates. 
Dependent variable Yes vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All protest 0.015** 0.015* 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0071) 
Net seat gain 0.0071* 0.0069* 0.0077* 0.0071* 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Disenfranchised -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.099 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.091) 
Patron controlled -0.10 -0.096 -0.088 -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Landed interest 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.070) (0.065) 
Whig/radical 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
Local newspapers -0.00015 -0.00015 -0.00018 -0.00020 
 (0.00032) (0.00035) (0.00032) (0.00029) 
Emp. Herfindahl index -1.19** -1.12** -1.24** -1.18** 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.53) 
Population density -0.029 -0.030 -0.031 -0.026 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Army career -0.15  -0.18 -0.16* 
 (0.094)  (0.11) (0.087) 
Financier -0.036  -0.011  
 (0.18)  (0.19)  
Industrialist 0.0072  -0.020  
 (0.22)  (0.21)  
Jurist 0.058  0.0014  
 (0.089)  (0.12)  
Merchant 0.015  0.0021  
 (0.15)  (0.15)  
Age (of MP)  0.0013 0.00062  
  (0.0027) (0.0027)  
Years in Parliament  -0.0040 -0.0039  
  (0.0043) (0.0041)  
Education  0.13 0.14  
  (0.092) (0.087)  
Grand tour  0.064 0.034  
  (0.10) (0.10)  
Dynasty heir  -0.030 -0.087  
  (0.068) (0.096)  
Relative in parliament  -0.10 -0.059  
  (0.083) (0.083)  
Note: Probit estimator. N=466. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean. Constant not shown. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. Col. (4) tests down using a general-to-specific 




Table A5: The effect of public protest on a MP’s vote in favor of the reform bill: Probit 
estimates with extra control variables 
Dependent variable Yes vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All protest 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.0073)** (0.0072)** (0.0067)** (0.0069)** (0.0069)** 
Net seat gain 0.0065 0.0071 0.0064 0.0099 0.0082 
 (0.0038)* (0.0038)* (0.0043) (0.0043)** (0.0050)* 
Disenfranchised -0.097 -0.082 -0.044 -0.096 -0.017 
 (0.089) (0.095) (0.11) (0.085) (0.10) 
Patron controlled -0.089 -0.096 -0.091 -0.10 -0.077 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Landed interest 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.31 
 (0.066)*** (0.063)*** (0.077)*** (0.067)*** (0.086)*** 
Whig/radical 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
 (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** 
Local newspapers -0.00016 -0.00022 -0.00024 -0.000095 -0.00014 
 (0.00028) (0.00030) (0.00026) (0.00036) (0.00032) 
Emp. Herfindahl index -1.18 -1.16 -1.10 -1.11 -1.07 
 (0.51)** (0.52)** (0.51)** (0.50)** (0.48)** 
Population density -0.031 -0.027 -0.033 -0.047 -0.057 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.047) 
Army career -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.085)** (0.086)* (0.081)** (0.086)* (0.079)** 
University constituency -0.11    -0.017 
 (0.21)    (0.10) 
Narrow franchise -0.076    -0.069 
 (0.075)    (0.075) 
Thriving economy  -0.022   -0.13 
  (0.093)   (0.23) 
Declining economy  -0.071   -0.064 
  (0.084)   (0.075) 
Agriculture (emp. share)   0.067  0.016 
   (0.52)  (0.52) 
Trade (emp. share)   0.37  0.29 
   (0.53)  (0.52) 
Professionals (emp. share)   1.72  1.82 
   (1.61)  (1.51) 
Top wealth    -0.072 -0.060 
    (0.10) (0.11) 
High wealth    -0.066 -0.041 
    (0.11) (0.13) 
Medium wealth    -0.16 -0.14 
    (0.11) (0.11) 
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 
Note: Probit estimator. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the county level. Constant not shown. Sample restricted to the English MPs who were 




A4: Correlation matrix between protest variables and petitions 
Table A6 shows the correlation matrix for the variables used to capture violent unrest 
and public agitation. We see that some of the variables are highly correlated, with correlation 
coefficients as high as 0.75, but most of them are modestly correlated.  





Meetings Gatherings Reform  
agitation 
Petitions 
Rural violence 1      
Urban violence -0.140** 1     
Meetings -0.183*** 0.757*** 1    
Gatherings  -0.119** 0.236*** 0.251*** 1   
Reform agitation -0.109* 0.437*** 0.436*** 0.709*** 1  
Petitions 0.064 0.563*** 0.413*** 0.059 0.148 1 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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A5. Attendance at the second reading on 22 March 1831 
 
Using the bibliographic information reported by Fisher, David (ed.), 2009, The History 
of Parliament: The House of Commons 1820-1832, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
and the material available online at http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ (accessed 17 
September 2017), we list in Table A7 the four seats which were vacant on 22 March 1831 and 
report the reasons why the elections of the MPs to these seats were cancelled. Furthermore, as 
a follow-up to Table 8 where we compute the probability that each MP would have supported 
reform had they been present, the counterfactual analysis in Table A8 assigns a vote outcome 
to the absent MPs' by examining the changes in the level of riots and constituencies' 
characteristics. We find that low levels of protest would have led nearly 60% of the 18 absent 
MPs to support reform but only extreme levels of protest would have induced all of them to 
support reform. Finally, in Table A9, we report the remainder of the counterfactual exercise in 




Table A7. Seats without Representation in the House of Commons, 22 March 1831 
 
Borough County MP Affiliation Occupation Reason for cancellation 
Colchester Essex Andrew Spottiswoode Tory Merchant On 21 March 1831, the election committee cancelled his election, arguing that 
Spottiswoode was disqualified by his patent as King's printer. 
Durham City Durham County Roger Gresley Tory Landowner On 8 March 1831, the election of Gresley (but not of Michael Angelo Taylor, the 
other MP for Durham City) was cancelled because of bribery and intimidation. 
While Gresley reentered the House of Commons on 19 March 1831 for New 
Romney, the new MP for Durham City, William Richard Carter Chaytor, only 
entered Parliament on 23 March 1831. 
 
Evesham Worcestershire Charles Cockerell 





On 13 December 1830, the election committee cancelled the elections of Charles 
Cokerell and Archibald Kennedy who were found guilty of bribery. No new 
election took place until the dissolution of April 1831. 
 




Table A8. Absent MPs' vote: A counterfactual analysis 
   All protest Peaceful protest Urban violent Meetings  
       
Predicted Reform Supporters Among Absent MPs   59.98% 59.94% 89.22% 82.47%  
Percentile of Variable in Overall Sample  78th 78th 75th 76th  
Distribution of events (percentile) 1st 59.15% 59.40% 88.74% 81.55%  
 10
th 59.98% 59.55% 88.85% 81.74%  
 25
th 60.43% 59.96% 89.08% 82.42%  
 50
th 63.07% 63.35% 89.71% 85.81%  
 75
th 82.33% 83.16% 100% 98.92%  
 90
th 100% 100% 100% 100%  
  99
th 100% 100% 100% 100%  
       
   Gatherings Reform Agitation Petitions Net seat gain Landed interest 
Predicted Reform Supporters Among Absent MPs   67.30% 85.08% 100% 100% 94.22% 
Percentile of Variable in Overall Sample  84th 86rd 94th 29th 81th 
Distribution of events (percentile) 1st 67.30% 84.25% 76.50% 14.59% 94.22% 
 10th 67.30% 84.27% 100% 35.74% 94.22% 
 25
th 67.33% 84.30% 100% 65.22% 94.22% 
 50
th 67.44% 87.17% 100% 100% 94.22% 
 75
th 69.54% 90.18% 100% 100% 94.22% 
 90
th 100% 94.02% 100% 100% 94.22% 
  99
th 100% 100% 100% 100% 94.22% 
 
Note: This table provides a counterfactual analysis for the vote of absent MPs on 22 March 1831. For each variable of protest and constituency characteristics, we report three 
sets of results. First, we report the predicted percentage that the 18 absent MPs would have supported reform based on their observable characteristics. Second, we report where 
the average value of each variable in the sample of 18 MPs is located in the overall distribution of each variable. Third, we determine its value at the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 





Table A9. Counterfactual analysis of the levels of protest and constituencies' characteristics on the MPs' votes 
 
 
Note: This table reports results for a counterfactual analysis where we use the results column 3 of Table 6 and in columns 2, 5 and 6 of Table 7: all protest, peaceful protest, meetings, and gatherings. 
For each variable, we determine its value at the 1st, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentile of the distribution, and using the relevant regression we report the predicted probability that the 466 MPs 
would have voted for reform (with 95 percent confidence intervals in curly brackets). Standard errors for the predicted values are reported in square brackets.




























1st 46.75% 218 46.84% 218 47.61% 222 47.64% 222   
 [0.015] {204;232} [0.015] {205;232} [0.013] {210;234} [0.016] {208;236}   
10th 46.84% 218 46.86% 218 47.61% 222 47.66% 222   
 [0.015] {205;232} [0.015] {205;232} [0.013] {210;234} [0.016] {208;236}   
25th 46.88% 218 46.90% 219 47.62% 222 47.71% 222   
 [0.015] {205;232} [0.015] {205;232} [0.013] {210;234} [0.016] {208;237}   
50th 47.15% 220 47.24% 220 47.63% 222 47.99% 224   
 [0.014] {207;233} [0.014] {207;233} [0.013] {210;234} [0.015] {210;237}   
75th 48.89% 228 49.02% 228 47.82% 223 49.00% 228   
 [0.013] {216;239} [0.013] {217;240} [0.014] {211;235} [0.014] {216;241}   
90th 52.41% 244 52.64% 245 51.91% 242 51.16% 238   
 [0.023] {223;265} [0.024] {223;268} [0.025] {219;265} [0.016] {224;253}   
99th 63.80% 297 64.08% 299 63.17% 294 62.14% 290   
  [0.084] {221;374} [0.088] {218;379} [0.098] {205;384} [0.071] {225;354}   
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A6. Overall protests and the support for reform: An IV approach  
 In this section, we report instrumental variables results that help bolster the causal 
interpretation of the effect of public protest on the MP’s vote. For this purpose, we need an 
instrumental variable that, on the one hand, explains the geographic pattern of protest and, on 
the other hand, influences the MPs’ vote decisions only through its effect on public protest. We 
conjecture that public protest is influenced by population pressure in an area, which is, 
conditional on the party affiliation of the MPs and the other control variables, not a factor in the 
MPs’ vote decisions. Specifically, as an instrument for protest in county c, we propose the 
variable population pressure1811-1831,c. It is defined as the interaction between the average 
population growth rate between 1811 and 1831 and population density in county c in 1811. We 
then estimate an IV-probit model with a maximum likelihood estimator which jointly estimate 
the parameters of equation (1) from the main body of the text and the parameters of the equation 
capturing the relationship between the endogenous variable (all protest) and the instrument: 
(𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑐 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒1811−1831,𝑐 + 𝑋𝑘,𝑑,𝑐𝛾2 + 𝑢𝑐 (IV) 
 
where 𝑢𝑐  is an error term which is normally distributed. The other variables are defined in 
equation 1 in the main body of the text.  
Table A10 reports three sets of the IV-Probit estimate of equations (1) and (IV). For each 
set, we report the estimate of 𝛾1 from equation (IV) and the estimate of the coefficient on all 
protest from equation 1. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for all protest defined as the total 
number of participants, columns 3 and 4 show the results for all protest defined as the total 
number of participants per capita, and columns 5 and 6 show the results for all protest defined 
as the total number of protest events. We observe that population pressure1811-1831,c has a positive 
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and significant impact on the scale of protests in all cases.34 The IV estimate of the coefficient 
on all protest (# participants) is positive but imprecisely estimated with a p-value of 0.14, while 
the coefficients on all protest (# participants per capita) and all protest (# events) are significant 
at the ten percent level, but about seven times larger than the corresponding estimate obtained 
from the regular Probit regression reported at the bottom of the table. The Wald test also reported 
at the bottom of Table A10 does not reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. The regular 
Probit regression may, therefore, be appropriate. 
                                                            
34 Since we only have one instrument, we cannot investigate the violent unrest and peaceful protest separately. 
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Table A10: Effect of protest on the probability that a MP voted in favor of the reform bill on 
22 March 1831: IV-probit estimates.  




Yes vote All  
Protest 
Yes vote All 
 Protest 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
All protest (#participants) 0.042      
 [0.029]      
All protest (#participants/cap)   3.07    
   [1.72]*    
All protest (#events)     0.50  
     [0.30]*  
Population pressure 1811-31  0.12  0.002  0.01 
  [0.008]***  [0.0003]***  [0.002]*** 
       
       
Wald test for exogeneity   0.90  0.32  0.30 
Probit estimate 0.015  0.47  0.072  
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 466 
Note: IV-Probit maximum likelihood estimator. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory 
variables. Constant and control variables (which are the same as in Table 6, column 3) not shown. Standard errors 
in parentheses. Sample restricted to the English MPs who were present in the House of Commons on 22 March 
1831 and voted. The instrument is population pressure 1811-1831 in the county defined as the average population 




A7. Descriptive statistics 
Table A11: Descriptive statistics for the (new) variables used in Tables A1, A2 and A5. 
      
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
   
 County-Level Variation 
Public protest       
All protest (# events) 489 0.78 1.13 0.0100 9.05 
Violent unrest (# events) 489 0.19 0.24 0 1.99 
Peaceful protest (# events) 489 0.60 0.92 0.0100 7.06 
Rural violent (# events) 489 0.094 0.14 0 0.43 
Urban violent (# events) 489 0.092 0.22 0 1.99 
Meetings (# events) 489 0.52 0.81 0.0100 6.19 
Gatherings (# events) 489 0.077 0.12 0 0.87 
Reform agitation (# events) 489 0.12 0.13 0 0.95 
All protest (# participants per capita) 489 0.082 0.19 0.0002 1.93 
All protest (# participants per adult male) 489 0.33 0.68 0.0007 6.64 
Demographic and economic controls      
Top wealth 489 0.19 0.40 0 1 
High wealth 489 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Medium wealth 489 0.25 0.43 0 1 
  
 Constituency-Level Variation 
Institutional controls      
University constituency 489 0.0082 0.090 0 1 
Narrow franchise 489 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Expected consequences of reform      
Net seat gain (%) 489 -3.68 43.4 -66.7 150 
Net seat gain proposal 489 -5.91 9.48 -31 6 
Demographic and economic controls      
Local newspapers per capita 489 4.71 24.2 0 245 
Thriving economy 489 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Declining economy 489 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Agriculture (emp. share) 489 0.19 0.18 0 1 
Trade (emp. share) 489 0.37 0.13 0 0.87 
Professionals (emp. share) 489 0.055 0.027 0 0.14 
      
Note: The sample is restricted to the 489 English seats. The protest variables related to the number of 




Table A12: Summary statistics for the (English) MPs’ personal characteristics used in Table A4 
and Table 10. 
 N Mean sd min max 
      
Army career 466 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Financier 466 0.055 0.23 0 1 
Industrialist 466 0.051 0.22 0 1 
Jurist 466 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Merchant 466 0.090 0.29 0 1 
Age of MP 466 44.8 13.0 21 79 
Years in Parliament 466 11.2 10.5 1 51 
Education 466 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Grand tour 466 0.077 0.27 0 1 
Dynasty heir 466 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Relative in parliament 466 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Landowner 466 0.45 0.50 0 1 
      
Note: Education is equal to 1 if the MP has at least secondary education. The sample is restricted to the 
466 English MPs who voted on the bill. 
 
Table A13: Descriptive statistics for the constituency sample used in Table 11. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
  
 County-Level Variation 
Public protest participation      
All protest (10000s) 244 1.52 3.05 0 15.8 
Violent unrest (10000s) 244 0.094 0.20 0 0.94 
Peaceful protest (10000s) 244 1.42 2.93 0 14.9 
Petitions 244 1.36 2.31 -2 27 
Expected consequences of reform      
Net seat gain 244 -4.01 9.52 -28 12 
Institutional controls      
Local newspapers 244 15.3 59.6 0 303 
  
 Constituency-Level Variation 
Political controls      
Whig share in 1830 244 42.9 37.9 0 100 
Whig share in 1826 244 39.2 39.4 0 100 
Expected consequences of reform      
Disenfranchised 244 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Landed interest 244 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Patron controlled 244 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Demographic and economic controls      
Emp. Herfindahl index (1831) 244 0.76 0.073 0.24 0.86 
Population density (1831) 244 5.56 0.84 3.92 9.79 
      





Table A14: Descriptive statistics for the new variables used in Table 12 and Table A10. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
  
 Seat-Level Variation 
Support for parliamentary reform      
Yes vote, 1810 487 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Yes vote, 1822 487 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Members of Parliament      
Whig/radical 1810 486 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Whig/radical 1822 487 0.41 0.49 0 1 
  
 County-Level Variation 
Expected consequences of reform      
Net seat gain  489 -4.01 9.51 -28 12 
Institutional controls      
Local newspapers  489 16.6 62.3 0 303 
Instrumental variable      
Population pressure 1811-31 489 93.9 27.2 38.4 160.0 
  
 Constituency-Level Variation 
Expected consequences of reform      
Disenfranchised 489 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Landed interest 489 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Political controls      
Uncontested elections, 1810 489 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Uncontested elections, 1822 489 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Demographic and economic controls      
Emp. Herfindahl index, 1811 489 0.50 0.13 0.053 0.67 
Emp. Herfindahl index, 1821 489 0.51 0.13 0.065 0.66 
Population density, 1811 489 5.73 1.34 2.25 15.0 
Population density, 1821 489 5.70 0.94 2.85 9.84 
      
 





A8. Estimating newspaper circulation 
To obtain newspaper circulation numbers, we rely on information from two returns to 
the House of Commons in 1833 regarding the stamp duties paid by each newspaper published 
in London and in the English provinces (House of Commons, 1833a, 1833b). Each (newspaper) 
page published required a stamp so that these figures can be converted into an estimate of the 
newspapers’ circulation. We follow Wadsworth (1955) and use the following conversion 
factors: for weekly newspapers, 50000 stamps per year correspond to 1000 copies sold by 
weekly newspapers each week; 3.2 million stamps per year correspond to 10000 copies sold 
by daily newspapers each day. We convert the thrice and twice dailies into dailies and use the 
conversion factor for the dailies to estimate the number of copies per day. The weekly 
circulation numbers are converted into yearly figures by assuming 52 weeks per year and the 
daily circulation numbers are converted into yearly numbers by assuming 52 six-day weeks. 
Outside London, all 130 local or regional newspapers were weeklies; in London there were 12 
dailies (with The Times being by far the largest), seven newspapers published three times a 
week, one twice a week and 37 weeklies. To make London comparable to the provinces, we 




A9. Historical Evidence  
The results of the statistical analysis support the Political Expedience and Public 
Opinion Hypotheses while the Threat of Revolution Hypothesis receives less of a strong 
support. As a complement to this, we consider, in this section, historical evidence on the 
importance of threat of revolution, reform related agitation, lobbying and mass-mobilization, 
and political expedience as perceived by the participants themselves and contemporaneous 
observers. For this purpose, we draw on the transcripts of the debates in the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords, Newspaper reports and private letters, along with secondary sources.  
A9.1. The threat of revolution 
The Whig school of Victorian historians (e.g., McCarthy 1852; Trevelyan, 1920) 
emphasize that in 1830-1832, Britain was on the brink of a revolution that was only avoided 
by the timely concessions made by the ruling oligarchy (Trevelyan 1937, pp. 635-36). 
Historians of the British working class, such as Cole (1927), Cole and Postgate (1961) and 
Thompson (1963), also emphasize revolutionary threats and the possibility of an alliance 
between urban workers and the middle class as the cause of the reform. It is certainly true that 
many of the elements of a revolution were present in the early 1830s: a major rural uprising 
(the Swing riots), an emerging urban working class, a disgruntled middle class unhappy with 
the unreformed political system, vocal Radical leaders, a network of political unions that could 
mobilize thousands of reform supporters to their meetings, and the newspapers reported with 
direct reference to the July revolution in France that tricolor flags were paraded at 
demonstrations in London. It is also true that there were rumors of an uprising if the bill failed; 
and the fact that the authorities hastily filled the Tower of London’s moat with water to forestall 
an attack and ringed London with 7000 troops and stationed 2000 New Police in Westminster 
in the autumn of 1830 suggests that the threat was considered real (Tilly, 1995, pp. 287-88). In 
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a private letter to the MP Joseph Hume, Chartist leader Francis Place warned that “there must 
be a radical change, not a sham reform ….. if all concessions be refused, the people will become 
outraged and no one can tell what may follow.” It is also clear from the transcripts of the seven 
days of debate that preceded the roll call vote on 22 March 1831 that many MPs saw the reform 
as a necessary means to avoid a revolution. John Russell who had presented the bill on March 
1st, 1831, had the opportunity to make the last substantive remarks on 22 March 1831. He used 
the example of the revolution in France in July 1830 to suggest that it could have been 
prevented by concessions to the people and that reform in Britain was now required to avoid a 
revolution. Similar views were expressed in the debate in the House of Lords in November 
1830 when Prime Minister Charles Grey first announced that he intended to seek reform. The 
Earl of Radnor said “that Parliamentary Reform was not merely expedient, but the only 
measure which could ensure the salvation of the country” (Hansard HL Deb 22 November 
1830, vol. 1, c604); a view also expressed by Grey himself in his speech to the House of Lords. 
This suggests the possibility that some MP were, in fact, influenced by fear of a revolution or 
at least were willing to use the threat of a revolution as an argument in the debate.  
A9.2. Public Opinion  
The many meetings and demonstrations organized by reform supporters around the 
country in 1830-31 were brought to the attention of the MPs and other members of the reading 
public through reports in local and national newspapers. For example, on 8 March 1831, one 
could read in the Times and in the Manchester Guardian that a meeting in Manchester gathered 
3,000 participants in support of the reform bill. It is clear from the debate in the House of 
Commons that such meetings made an impression on the MPs and “public support” was used 
as one argument for the reform. The Whig MP Thomas Denman, for example, appealed to “a 
great meeting in the county of Nottingham where almost every respectable gentleman attended 
and where the resolution had been unanimously in favor of the measure [reform]” in his defense 
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of the reform on 22 March 1831 (Hansard HC Deb 22 March 1831, vol. 3, c719). Likewise, 
the Tory MP Robert Palmer voted in favor of the reform in deference to his Berkshire 
constituents’ strong support for the bill. He admitted in his contribution to the debates that his 
own had been the only dissentient voice at a meeting in his constituency and he reiterated that 
the bill went further than he could personally endorse (Fisher 2009). Of course, not all MPs 
were convinced by such agitation, but it is clear that the MPs were aware of it and sometimes 
participated in reform meetings themselves. Petitions also came to the attention of the MPs and 
of the Lords, and they were frequently mentioned both by supporters and opponents of reform. 
Many opponents, seeing themselves as “trustees” rather than as “delegates” (see below in sub-
section A9.3), went to great length explaining why they would vote against the bill despite the 
wishes of their voters. Tilly (1995, p. 239) describes this process of agitation as the 
“parliamentarization of contention”. Taken together, this suggests that the MPs might have 
been influenced by agitation, petitions and by mass mobilization in favor of reform in the areas 
where they were elected bolstering our interpretation of the statistical results. 
A9.3. Political expedience 
Many MPs viewed themselves as “trustees” rather than as “delegates” representing the 
interest of their constituents (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006, Ch. 1). The view of a MP as a “trustee” 
was held particularly strongly by many Tory MPs who saw it as their role to act as they deemed 
to be in the national or wider public interest and to follow their ideological pre-disposition 
rather than the demands of their constituents or broader special interests.35 The support for a 
                                                            
35 It should be made clear that the MP as a “trustee” was not an invention of Tories in the last years of the 
Unreformed Parliament to defend the political status quo. Edmund Burke, a leading Whig intellectual, had written 
in 1770 that "[i]t is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of Government. It is the 
business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to 
employ them with effect" (Burke, 1770). Acting in accordance with his views, Burke neglected the interests of 
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limited, property based suffrage and redistribution of seats from the “rotten” boroughs to the 
industrial towns and cities amongst the Whig elite reflected a belief that this was a necessary 
condition for a stable society that they would naturally govern (Mitchell 2005). The Tory 
opposition was based on the idea of the “territorial constitution” which centers on 
landownership and which gives owners of real property the right to govern, not only to protect 
their fixed assets, but also to ensure as trustees that all interests of society are considered (Gash 
1951). One example of this is the defense of the unreformed system that Philip Henry Stanhope, 
Viscount Mahon, who represented the “rotten” borough of Wootton Basset, articulated during 
the debate in the House of Commons on 22 March 1831. He stressed how the nomination 
constituencies of Gatton and Old Sarum served the useful purpose of counterpoising the effect 
of more popular representation elsewhere and thus ensured the “blending of several interests 
in forming a perfect whole” (Hansard HC Deb 22 March 1831, vol. 3, c719). However, in the 
same way that the Whig support for reform can be seen as an attempt to gain party political 
advantage, there was clearly a personal motive underlying such a principled stance against 
reform: the prospective loss of a seat. The fact that many other speakers in the debate went to 
great length to stress their role as trustees and that they opposed the reform bill out of principle 
and not because they would personally be affected suggests that, at the very least, there was a 
suspicion that personal expedience played a role in the way the MPs voted.   
                                                            
the voters who had returned him in the contested constituency of Bristol in 1774 and was defeated in the following 
election in 1780. 
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A10. Definitions and sources 
Support for parliamentary reform 
Yes vote (Second Reading of Great Reform Act) is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP, 
who took part in the second reading of the Great Reform Act on 22 March 1831, voted in favour 
of the reform bill and equal to zero otherwise. Source: Hansard (1831, vol. 2, pp. 719-826). 
Present is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP was present in the House of Commons 
on March 22 1831 for the vote and zero if not. Source: Hansard (1831, vol. 2, pp. 719-826). 
Yes vote, 1810 is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP, who took part in the vote on the 
reform bill put forward by Thomas Brand on 21 May 1810 (1807 Parliament), voted in favour 
of the bill and equal to zero otherwise. Source: Hansard, House of Commons (1810, vol. 15). 
Yes vote, 1822 is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP, who took part in the vote of on 
the reform bill put forward by Lord John Russell on 25 April 1822 (1820 Parliament), voted in 
favour of the reform bill and equal to zero otherwise. Source: Hansard, House of Commons 
(1822, vol. 7). 
Members of Parliament 
Whig/Radical YEAR with YEAR  1810, 1822, and 1830 is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a MP belonged to the Whig or Radical faction in Parliament and zero otherwise in the 
relevant year. It is not a straightforward task to determine the political affiliation of the MPs. 
The Tory and Whig groups were relatively loose organizations and some MPs changed their 
allegiance over their political careers. To construct a complete record of the political affiliations 
of all the English MPs elected in 1830, we started with the information given in Hansard (1831, 
vol. 2, pp. 719-826) and evaluated and compared the bibliographical information provided by 
Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and 
Fisher (2009). Disagreement amongst the sources was, typically, due to the fact that a MP had 
changed affiliation over his career. In these cases, we resolved the disagreement by associating 
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the MP with his party affiliation as of 1830. For the MPs selected for the 1810 and 1822 
parliament, we followed a similar procedure, except that the Hansard could not be used as a 
starting point because no party affiliation was reported in relation to the failed reform bills in 
1810 and 1822. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), 
Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Age of MP codes the age of each MP as of March 1831. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), 
Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009).  
Army career is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was a career soldier and zero 
otherwise. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), 
Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Dynasty heir is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was returned to a seat when coming 
of age and without any other occupation. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke 
(1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Financier is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was a banker or working in the 
financial sector and zero otherwise. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), 
Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Industrialist is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was an industrialist and zero 
otherwise. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), 
Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Jurist is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was a lawyer or had a legal profession 
(e.g., being a judge) and zero otherwise. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke 
(1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Merchant is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was a merchant and zero otherwise. 
Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), 
and Fisher (2009). 
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Relative in parliament is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP had a relative in 
Parliament. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), 
Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Education is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP attended secondary schooling and/or 
university. Source: Fisher (2009). 
Grand tour is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP took a Grand Tour in Continental 
Europe in his early 20s. Source: Fisher (2009). 
Years in Parliament is the number of years that a MP sat in Parliament (with or without 
interruptions) prior to 1831. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks 
Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Landowner is a dummy variable equal to one if the MP was a significant landowner. 
Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), 
and Fisher (2009). 
Whig share in YEAR with YEAR  1826, 1830 is the percentage share of seats in a 
constituency won by either Whig or Radical candidates in YEAR election. Source: Thorne 
(1986) and Fisher (2009). 
Protest 
All protest is the estimated number of participants in all types of protest in England and 
Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Violent unrest is the estimated number of participants in violent unrest in England and 
Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Peaceful protest is the number of participants in peaceful protest in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
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Rural violent is the estimated number of participants in rural violent unrest in England and 
Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Rural violent unrest is 
approximated by the Swing riots. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Urban violent is the estimated number of participants in urban violent unrest in England 
and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Urban violent unrest is 
calculated as the difference between violent unrest and rural violent. Source Horn and Tilly 
(1988). 
Meetings is the number of estimated participants in meetings and delegations in England 
and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly 
(1988). 
Gatherings is the estimated number of participants in gatherings (unannounced meetings 
and demonstrations) in England and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by 
county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Reform agitation is the estimated number of participants in reform related agitation 
(meetings and gatherings) in England and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, 
by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
All protest (#event) is the number of all types of protest events in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Violent unrest (#event) is the number violent unrest events in England and Wales between 
1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Peaceful protest (#event) is the number of peaceful protest events in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Rural violent (#event) is the number of rural violent unrest events in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Rural violent unrest is approximated 
by the Swing riots. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
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Urban violent (#event) is the number of urban violent unrest events in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Urban violent unrest is calculated as 
the difference between violent unrest and rural violent. Source Horn and Tilly (1988).  
Meetings (#event) is the number of meetings and delegations in England and Wales 
between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Gatherings (#event) is the number of gatherings (unannounced meetings and 
demonstrations) in England and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by county. 
Source Horn and Tilly (1988).  
Reform agitation (#event) is the number of reform related agitation (meetings and 
gatherings) events in England and Wales between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831, by 
county. Source Horn and Tilly (1988). 
Petitions is the difference between the number of petitions for and against parliamentary 
reform received by the House of Commons between 1 January 1828 and 22 March 1831 
originating from each constituency. The data were constructed by word searches for the name 
of each constituency in the list of petitions related to parliamentary reform. Source: Journal of 
the House of Commons (1828-1831, vol. 83-86). 
Expected consequences of reform 
Net seat gain reports the difference between the number of seats allocated to each county 
and to the borough constituencies located within its borders by the reform (based on the final 
seat allocation) and the number of seats in the Unreformed Parliament. Source: Philbin (1965). 
Net seat gain proposal reports the difference between the number of seats allocated to 
each county and to the borough constituencies located within its borders by the reform (using 
the proposed seat allocation) and the number of seats in the Unreformed Parliament. This 
variable is used in Table A2. Source The statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland (1832, pp. 154–206).  
106 
 
Disenfranchised is a dummy variable equal to one if the constituency that a MP 
represented was scheduled in the bill to lose all seats and zero otherwise. Source: The statutes 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1832, pp. 154–206). 
Patron controlled is a dummy variable equal to one if the constituency was under full or 
partial control of a local patron or by the Treasure or if no contested election had taken place 
since 1802, and zero otherwise. Source: Philbin (1965), Cannon (1973) and Fisher (2009). 
Landed interest is a dummy variable equal to one if a MP was elected to a county seat and 
zero if he was elected to either a borough or to one of the university seats. Source: Dod and 
Dod (1832), Namier and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher 
(2009). 
Institutional controls 
Local newspapers is an estimate of the number of newspapers circulated in each county 
in 1831. See Appendix A8 for how this is calculated. Source: House of Commons (1833a, 
1833b).  
University constituency is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the two university 
constituencies. The universities of Cambridge and Oxford had the right to return two MPs each. 
The electors were the graduates of the two universities. Source: Dod and Dod (1832), Namier 
and Brooke (1964), Stooks Smith (1973), Thorne (1986), and Fisher (2009). 
Narrow franchise is a dummy variable that is equal to one for borough constituencies with 
either a burgage or a corporation franchise and to zero otherwise. Under the Unreformed 
Parliament there were six different types of parliamentary franchises in operation for the 
borough constituencies: scot and lot, potwalloper, freeman, freeholder, burgage, and 
corporation franchises. The burgage and corporation boroughs had very narrow franchises, 
which often limited the number of voters to less than 50. In the burgage boroughs, only the 
owners of a property with an old form of tenure, called the burgage, could vote. These were 
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often limited to plots of land that had formed the borough when it was first laid out and could 
be owned by a single person. In the corporation boroughs, only members of the local town 
council, called the corporation, could vote. In other boroughs with scot and lot, potwalloper, or 
freeman franchises, the electorate tended to be more sizable but rarely included more than 1000 
voters, except in the largest towns such as London, Westminster and Bristol. Source: Philbin 
(1965) and Brock (1973, Table 2). 
Uncontested elections YEAR with YEAR 1810, 1822, is equal to one for a constituency if 
none of the eight previous elections excluding the current one was contested, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Cannon (1973, Appendix III). 
Demographic, economic and spatial controls 
Emp. Herfindahl index is the sum of the square of the share of individuals in each Census 
registration district working in agriculture, in trade as professionals and in other occupational 
categories. Each constituency is matched to the Census registration district that is the closest 
geographical unit and is coded for 1811, 1821 and 1831. Source: Census of Great Britain (1811, 
1821, 1831). 
Population density is the number of inhabitants per inhabited house in the constituency 
and is coded for 1811, 1821 and 1831. Source: Census of Great Britain (1811, 1821, 1831). 
Top wealth is a dummy variable equal to one if the county belongs to the fourth and highest 
quartile of the county level wealth distribution. Source: Census of Great Britain (1831) 
“Population. Comparative account of the population of Great Britain in the years 1801, 1811, 
1821 and 1831” pp. 348ff.” 
High wealth is a dummy variable equal to one if the county belongs to the third quartile 
of the county level wealth distribution. Census of Great Britain (1831) “Population. 
Comparative account of the population of Great Britain in the years 1801, 1811, 1821 and 
1831” pp. 348ff.” 
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Medium wealth is a dummy variable equal to one if the county belongs to the third quartile 
of the county level wealth distribution. Source: Census of Great Britain (1831) “Population. 
Comparative account of the population of Great Britain in the years 1801, 1811, 1821 and 
1831” pp. 348ff.” 
Thriving economy is a dummy variable that is equal to one if Philbin (1965) singles out 
the constituency as being prosperous around 1830, and zero otherwise. Source: Philbin (1965). 
Declining economy is a dummy variable that is equal to one if Philbin (1965) singles out 
the constituency as being in decline around 1830, and zero otherwise. Source: Philbin (1965). 
Agriculture (emp. share) is the number of tenant farmers and large landowners employing 
agricultural laborers, tenant farmers not employing agricultural laborers, and agricultural 
laborers as a proportion of the workforce in each Census registration district. Each constituency 
is matched to the Census registration district that is the closest geographical unit. Source: 
Census of Great Britain, 1831. 
Trade (emp. share) is the number of persons listed working in industry, trade or as artisans 
as a proportion of the workforce in each Census registration district. Each constituency is 
matched to the Census registration district that is the closest geographical unit. Source: Census 
of Great Britain, 1831. 
Professionals (emp. share) is the number of professionals (lawyer, doctors, and so on) as 
a proportion of the workforce in each Census registration district. Each constituency is matched 
to the Census registration district that is the closest geographical unit. Source: Census of Great 
Britain, 1831 
Distance to London (inverse) is the inverse of the travel time distance from each 
constituency to London measured in units of travel days (assuming that a person can travel 30 





Population pressure 1811-31 is the average population growth rate between 1811 and 
1831 in each county times population density in 1811. Source: Census of Great Britain 1811, 
1821 and 1831.  
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Figure A1: Gatherings and Meetings in English and Welsh counties by number of participants, 1 January 1828 - 22 March 1831. 
 
Figure A1a. Meetings 
 
Figure A1b. Gatherings 
 Source: Horn and Tilly (1988). 
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